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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
IN SITUATIONS in which "the buyer wrongfully rejects
or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a pay-
ment due on or before delivery or repudiates,"' section 2-
706 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code) allows
the aggrieved seller to take back or withhold delivery of
the goods, to resell the goods in good faith and in a com-
mercially reasonable manner, and to recover the differ-
ence between the contract price and the resale price, plus
incidental damages, less expenses saved as a result of the
buyer's breach. By allowing the seller to "fix" ' 2 his dam-
ages by a resale of the goods, section 2-706 represents a
marked departure from pre-Code law under the Uniform
Sales Act which did not recognize the resale formula as a
generally available damage remedy.3 The dominant dam-
age formula under the Uniform Sales Act was that based
on market or current price, and the amount received by
the seller on resale was merely evidence of that price.4
The primary advantages of the Code's resale formula are
that it is generally available, it stands on its own as a dam-
age measurement, and it allows the seller to avoid the
well-documented difficulties of proving market price at a
particular time and place.
Section 2-706 is the most precisely drafted of the
U.C.C. § 2-703 (1977).
2 See U.C.C. § 2-706 comments 2 & 7 (1977).
Section 60 of the Uniform Sales Act allowed a seller's resale as the basis for a
damage measurement only in the following circumstances:
Where the goods are of perishable nature, or where the seller ex-
pressly reserves the right of resale in case the buyer should make
default, or where the buyer has been in default in the payment of the
price an unreasonable time, an unpaid seller having a right of lien or
having stopped the goods in transit may resell the goods.
Uniform Sales Act § 60, IA U.L.A. 142 (1950).
4 See Uniform Sales Act § 64(3), IA U.L.A. 188 (1950).
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Code's damage provisions, and it addresses most of the
questions which have arisen concerning the mechanics of
its application. This statement, however, is subject to two
qualifications,, First, the answers provided by section 2-
706 are often couched in vague terms of "good faith" and
"commercial reasonableness," 5 which leave much to be
fleshed out by the courts and triers of fact according to
the circumstances of the individual case. Second, section
2-706 is silent at best, and misleading at worst, with re-
spect to its applicability to individual cases in which the
use of its formula would overcompensate the seller. Fur-
ther, in cases in which the resale formula clearly applies,
section 2-706 gives little guidance as to how the numerical
calculations under its formula are to be made. These mat-
ters are left to the courts under the guidance of the over-
riding principle of section 1-106 that the remedy be
"liberally administered" to the end of compensating the
seller without windfall and of charging the buyer without
penalty.6
It must be remembered that the resale formula will
compensate only full-capacity sellers, those whose supply
of goods is met or exceeded by the demand for them.
The resale formula will undercompensate a "lost-volume"
seller, one who could have made both the sale under the
breached contract and the sale under the resale contract,
by the amount of profit which he would have made on the
resale contract. Nothing, however, in the Code, in the
common law or in common sense prohibits an injured
party from bringing action for less damages than he has
suffered. Because damages, as a practical matter, are easy
to prove under the Code's resale formula, resale damages
are often sought by aggrieved sellers who would fare bet-
ter on the basis of lost profit, market price differential or
even the full unpaid contract price. To proceed success-
fully under section 2-706, the seller need only introduce
evidence of the price under the breached contract, the re-
U.C.C. § 2-706(1) (1977).
6 Id. § 2-106(1).
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sale price and his compliance with the section's rather in-
nocuous requirements.7 The burden of going forward
with evidence that the requirements of section 2-706 have
not been met then rests on the buyer. The cases demon-
strate that unless the buyer can show that the seller has
acted in some bizarre or unreasonably self-serving man-
ner in conducting the resale, the seller will be successful.
It is clear, however, that the requirements of good faith,
commercial reasonableness and notice must be met or the
seller will be denied damages based on the resale price.8
In the event that the seller is found not to have complied
with the requirements of section 2-706, he is not denied
recovery altogether but is relegated to recovery under
section 2-708, for damages based on market price or, in a
proper case, lost profit.9
B. Mitigation of Damages10
At common law, damages based on a resale by an ag-
grieved seller were allowed, if at all, only as evidence of
market value at the time of breach. If market value had
declined between the time of the buyer's breach and the
7 See id. § 2-706.
8 Id. § 2-706 Comment 2. Comment 2 provides: "Failure to act properly under
this section deprives the seller of the measure of damages here provided and rele-
gates him to that provided in Section 2-708." Id.
9 Id.
10 Section 2-706 provides:
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's
remedies, the seller may resell the goods concerned or the
undelivered balance thereof. Where the resale is made in good faith
and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the
difference between the resale price and the contract price together
with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this
Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of
the the buyer's breach.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) or unless
otherwise agreed resale may be at public or private sale including
sale by way of one or more contracts to sell or of identification to an
existing contract of the seller. Sale may be as a unit or in parcels and
at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the sale
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
commercially reasonable. The resale must be reasonably identified
as referring to the broken contract, but it is not necessary the the
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seller's resale, the resale could not be used to establish
damages." Under the Code, a resale conducted in good
faith and in a commercially reasonable manner continues
to be recognized as fair evidence of market price in an
action based on section 2-708.12 Under the Code, how-
ever, the justification for using resale price as a basis for
measuring damages is not as a hypothetical approxima-
tion of market value of the goods at the time of breach,
but rather as an incentive to the aggrieved seller to mini-
mize his loss and mitigate the damages chargeable to the
buyer. Market value is at best nothing more than a hypo-
goods be in existence or that any or all of them have been identified
to contract before the breach.
(3) Where the resale is a private sale the seller must give the
buyer reasonable notification of his intention to resell.
(4) Where the resale is at public sale
(a) only identified goods can be sold except where there is a
recognized market for a public sale of futures in goods of the kind;
and
(b) it must be made at a usual place or market for public sale if
one is reasonably available and except in the case of goods which
are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily the seller
must give the buyer reasonable notice of the time and place of the
resale; and
(c) if the goods are not to be within the view of those attending
the sale the notification of sale must state the place where the
goods are located and provide for their reasonable inspection by
prospective bidders; and
(d) the seller may buy.
(5) A purchaser who buys in good faith at a resale takes the goods
free of any rights of the original buyer even though the seller fails to
comply with one or more of the requirements of this section.
(6) The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made
on any resale. A person in the position of a seller (Section 2-707) or
a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance
must account for any excess over the amount of this security
interest, as hereinafter defined (subsection (3) of Section 2-711).
Id.
" See Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d 554, 233 P.2d 539, 542 (1951). See also
Dehahn v. Innes, 356 A.2d 711, 723, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 407 (Me.
1976) (seller has burden of proving that goods have not declined in value before
resale price may be used as evidence of market price under Section 2-708).
12 See Dehahn v. Innes, 356 A.2d 711, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 407
(Me. 1976); B & R Textile Corp. v. Paul Rothman Indust., 101 Misc. 2d 98, 420
N.Y.S.2d 609, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Quat-
tlebaum v. Schutt, 27 Agric. Dec. 242, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 370 (U.S.
Dept. of Agric. 1968).
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thetical approximation of damages and is wholly inade-
quate as a basis for compensating sellers in the vast
majority of real world sales cases.1 3 Accordingly, under
section 2-706, the properly conducted resale stands on its
own as a basis for damage measurement and prevails even
against a showing by the buyer that the market value of
the goods at the time of breach was greater than their sub-
sequent resale price. 4
The theoretical thread running throughout section 2-
706, tying together the section's general requirements of
good faith and commercial reasonableness, is the minimi-
zation of losses and the mitigation of damages. Indeed,
the courts have by and large addressed the requirements
of good faith and commercial reasonableness in terms of
whether the seller in a particular case could have, by
adopting a different course of action, resold the goods at
a higher price and thereby further mitigated the damages
chargeable to the buyer. In conducting the resale, the
seller must act within a commercially reasonable time to
mitigate his damages and may not speculate about market
conditions at the buyer's expense.' 5  Accordingly, in
judging a commercially reasonable time for a seller's re-
sale, the courts have held that the resale should be made
as soon as possible after the breach and that the seller
13 See generally, Anderson, Mapping the Labyrinth of Sellers' Damages, 10 LITIGATION
10, 13-14 (1983); Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 259
(1963). See also Capital Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574
S.W.2d 256, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1349 (1978); Cesco Mfg. v. Nor-
cross, Inc., 391 N.E.2d 270, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 126 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979).
14 See President Container, Inc. v. Patimco, 82 A.2d 879, 440 N.Y.S.2d 313, 31
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1371 (1981). See also United States v. Terrey, 554
F.2d 685, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1488 (5th Cir. 1977) (disparity be-
tween market price and resale price is but one factor to be considered in deter-
mining the commercial reasonableness of the resale).
5 See G. & R. Corp. v. American Security & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1175, 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 33 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But see Serna, Inc. v. Harmon,
742 F.2d 186, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 481 (5th Cir. 1984) (there is no
express requirement in section 2-706 that the seller resell "without unreasonable
delay" but only that he act "in good faith" in "in a commercially reasonable
manner").
41719851
418 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
should make every reasonable effort to minimize his
loss.16
While fleshing out the requirements of good faith and
commercial reasonableness under section 2-706, the atti-
tude of the courts has closely paralleled that which they
have traditionally demonstrated at common law in dam-
age mitigation cases. In particular, doubts are resolved in
favor of the injured party, and the reasonableness of his
course of action is judged on the basis of the facts as they
are known at the time of resale.1 7 For these reasons, a
buyer cannot defeat a seller's recovery on the basis of re-
sale merely by showing either that the market value at the
time of breach was higher than the resale price or that the
goods could actually have been resold at a higher price.
In the former case, the buyer must further show that the
seller' delayed unreasonably; in the latter case, he must
further show that the seller knew or should have known of
the availability of a resale at a higher price. These matters
are discussed more fully in Section III below.
C. The Requirements
Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell by either private
or public sale.' 8 The distinction between the two is based
on whether or not bidding will occur.' 9 Comment 4 to
section 2-706 states that "public" sale means a sale by
auction. 20 Accordingly, fixed price sales such as over-the-
counter sales by merchants or garage or tag sales by non-
merchants are not "public sales," even though the sales
are open to the public generally. The seller does not have
16 See Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 209, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1154, (D.S.D. 1977); Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp.
341, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afd, 469 F.2d 696
(2d Cir. 1972).
17 U.C.C. § 2-704 comment 2 (1977) which, in discussing mitigation of damages
in a different context, provides that the seller's "exercise of reasonable commer-
cial judgment" is to be viewed in terms of "the facts as they appear at the time he
learned of the breach."
1" U.C.C. § 2-706(3) & (4) (1977).




an unfettered option beween public and private resale;
the choice is governed by the general requirements of
good faith and commercial reasonableness.2 ' Comment 4
to section 2-706 provides that "in choosing between a
public and private sale the character of the goods must be
considered and relevant trade practices and usages must
be observed.
22
If a public resale is held, it must be at the usual place
for such sales.23 Goods generally do not have a usual
place for sale by auction, and the reference here is to
goods such as antiques and collectables, grain, produce,
livestock, and the like. If a usual place for public resale is
not reasonably available, then "a duly advertised public
resale may be held at another place if it is one which pro-
spective bidders may reasonably be expected to attend, as
distinguished from a place where there is no demand
whatsoever for goods of the kind."'24 In some cases, for
example resale of livestock, rare antiques, paintings or art
objects, a public sale may be the only commercially rea-
sonable method of resale in the important sense of elicit-
ing the highest price for the goods.25
Regardless of whether the resale is public or private,
the resale must be reasonably identified with the broken
contract and must be conducted in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner.26
If the resale is private, the seller must notify the buyer
only of his intention to resell.2 7 However, in the case of a
public resale, the seller must also notify the buyer of the
time and place for resale .2  The purpose is to allow the
buyer an opportunity to bid at the sale or to solicit the
21 Id.
22 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus., 280 F. Supp. 698, 712, 4 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 977 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 398 F.2d 310, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 565 (3d Cir. 1968).
23 U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 4 (1977).
24 Id. § 2-706(4)(b).
25 Id. § 2-706 comment 9.
26 See W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-706:04 (1982).
27 U.C.C. § 2-706(1)&(2) (1977).
28 Id. § 2-706(3).
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attendance of other bidders.2 9 Notice is excused in cases
in which the g6ods are perishable or threaten to rapidly
decline in value.3 0 Even then, however, the general re-
quirement of commercial reasonableness may require no-
tice when it is possible prior to either a decline in the
condition of the goods or in their value. Three additional
requirements must be met in the case of public resale: (1)
the goods must be identified to the breached contract ex-
cept where there is an established market for sale of fu-
tures in the goods;3 ' (2) the resale must be at the usual
place for public sale if one is reasonably available; 32 and
(3) the goods must be displayed at the auction, or alter-
natively, the notification of sale must have stated the loca-
tion of the goods and have made provision for a
reasonable inspection of the goods by prospective bid-
ders. 3 These three additional requirements are readily
understandable, and a public resale which violated one or
more of them would almost certainly be held to be com-
mercially unreasonable.
The seller, as well as the buyer, may buy at the public
sale. 34 Comment 9 to section 2-706 states the rationale:
"The provision of paragraph (d) of subsection (4) permit-
ting the seller to bid and, of course, to become the pur-
chaser, benefits the original buyer by tending to increase
the resale price and thus decreasing the damages he will
have to pay."' 35 Failure to follow the requirements of sec-
tion 2-706 will deny the seller a recovery thereunder and
relegate him to damages under section 2-708.36 Such a
29 Id. § 2-706(4).
30 Id. § 2-706 comment 8.
31 Id.
32 id. § 2-706(4)(a).
- Id. § 2-706(4)(c).
34 Id. § 2-706(4)(d).
55 Id. § 2-706(4)(d).
36 Id. § 2-706 comment 9. See, e.g., B & R Textile Corp. v. Paul Rothman Ind.,
101 Misc.2d 98, 420 N.Y.S.2d 609, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979); Foxco Ind. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 26 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 694 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller v. Belk, 23 N.C. App. 1, 207 S.E.2d
792, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 627 (1974).
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failure will not affect the rights of a good faith purchaser
at the resale against the breaching buyer.3 7
1. Identified Goods
Section 2-706(2) provides that "it is not necessary that
the goods be in existence or that any or all of them have
been identified to the contract before the breach. 38  Of
course, the goods must be identified to the breached con-
tract prior to resale.3 9  "Identification" under the Code
means that the goods can be objectively verified as those
covered by the breached contract.4" To be identified to
the breached contract the goods must be both existing
and completed. 4 1 Section 2-704 of the Code allows the
seller to complete the goods following a breach by the
buyer and to identify them to the breached contract.4 2
The only exception to the identification requirement is
made by section 2-706(4)(a) for goods, such as commodi-
ties, which have a recognized market for public sale of fu-
tures in the goods.43
Only if the goods have been identified to the breached
contract can the seller comply with the further require-
ment in section 2-706 that the resale "be reasonably iden-
-7 Id. § 2-706(5).
38 Id.
d. § 2-706(2).
40 See Id. § 2-501(1). Section 2-501(1) provides that "identification can be made
at any time and in any manner explicitly agreed to by the parties. In the absence
of explicity, agreement, identification occurs . . . (c) when the contract is made if
it is for the sale of goods already existing and identified." Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. § 2-704(1). Section 2-704 provides:
(1) An aggrieved seller under the preceding section may
(a) identify to the contract conforming goods not already iden-
tified if at the time he learned of the breach they are in his posses-
sion or control;
(b) treat as the subject of resale goods which have demonstra-
bly been intended for the particular contract even though those
goods are unfinished.
Id. See Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 629
F.2d 1118, 1124 n.10, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996 (5th Cir. 1980) (not
necessary under section 2-706 that the goods be in existence at the time of the
breach).
4. U.C.C. § 2-706(4)(a) (1977).
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tified as referring to the broken contract. ' 44 No one
knows precisely-what this requirement means. It has no
historical antecedent, and the courts to date have shed lit-
tle light on its meaning. It is probably related to the pro-
vision in section 2-704(1)(b) which allows as the subject of
resale only "goods which have demonstrably been in-
tended for the particular contract" which has been
breached.45 Logically, if the seller can demonstrate at
trial that the resale contract was for goods which had been
intended for the breached contract, he has met his burden
of showing that the resale was "reasonably identified as
referring to the broken contract. '46 One of our most
knowledgeable commentators has speculated that the
purpose of the provision is to prevent the seller from
speculating at the buyer's expense.47 Merchant sellers
commonly have in stock and in manufacture a large
number of goods identical to those required by the
breached contract. Obviously such sellers could maxi-
mize their damages under section 2-706 by identifying as
the resale contract the lowest priced contract involving
such goods which was entered into within a commercially
reasonable time of the breach. At trial, the breaching
buyer would be hard pressed to counter the seller's testi-
mony that the resale contract was the lowest priced con-
tract involving identical goods. Accordingly, it has been
suggested that the provision requiring a reasonable iden-
tification between the resale contract and the breached
contract be read as requiring the seller to identify the re-
sale contract by notice to the buyer prior to its
consummation. 48
The suggestion, however, is not persuasive. It ignores
the fact that the only notice requirement for a private re-
44 Id. § 2-706(2). See Wolpert v. Foster, 254 N.W.2d 348, 351, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 516 (Minn. 1977).
45 U.C.C. § 2-704(1)(b) (1977).
46 Id. § 2-706(2).
47 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:03.
48 Id.
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sale is that of "intention to resell ' 49 and not of the actual
resale itself.50  Furthermore, subsection (2) of section 2-
706 allows the seller to identify as the resale contract any
one or more of his contracts existing at the time of
breach. There is no prohibition against his selecting that
existing contract with the lowest contract price as the re-
sale contract. Finally, the typical real world merchant
seller is in a "lost volume" situation at breach and will be
using as a resale contract one which he would have made
regardless of the breach. As long as the resale contract is
profitable, its use by such a seller in the damage formula
of section 2-706 will not violate the compensation princi-
ple to the buyer's disadvantage. In fact, even if he uses as
the resale contract the lowest profitable similar contract in
which he has entered, he will be undercompensated (put
in a worse position than he would have been had the
breached contract been performed) by the amount of
profit which he would have made on the resale contract.5'
49 U.C.C. § 2-706(2) (1977).
50 See Alco Standard Corp. v. F. & B. Mfg. Co., 51 Ill. 2d 186, 187, 281 N.E.2d
652, 653, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 639, 640 (1972) (holding that there is
no requirement under section 2-706 of notice of the "proposed sale" but that the
only notice required is of "intention to resell"). Of course, notice of resale can
accomplish the purpose of identifying the resale contract to the breached con-
tract. See Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1979).
See, Anderson, supra note 13 at 12:
"If the seller would have made the sale anyway, he is not really
being compensated. The seller is worse off by the amount of profit
that he would have made on the resale contract had the breached
contract been performed. Test it yourself. Pick any number of
transactions, figuring the contract price and profit on each one.
Then pick one of the transactions as the breached contract and an-
other (at a lower contract price, of course) as the resale contract.
Then get out your calculator, home computer, or new-math text-
book and figure the seller's profit both before and after the breach.
It does not matter what figures are used. You should find that,
whenever the resale would have been made anyway, the seller is go-
ing to be worse off by the amount of profit he would have made on
the resale contract than he would have been had the breached con-
tract been performed. The only exception occurs where the resale
contract has a price below the cost of producing the goods. If the
seller uses such a contract as the resale contract, he will always wind
up overcompensated. In other words, he will be in a better position
424 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
It is only when the seller is not at "lost volume" and the
buyer's breach allows him to make a resale which he
otherwise could not have made, that there is a potential
for abuse (overcompensation) in allowing the seller to
identify as the resale contract one other than the "true"
resale. Even here, section 2-706(2) can be read to allow
identification of an "existing contract of the seller" as the
resale contract. However, the overriding principle of
compensation under section 1-106 should in such cases
encourage the courts to hold that only the "true" resale
contract can "be reasonably identified as referring to the
broken contract."
In sum, there is no requirement in section 2-706 that
the buyer be notified in advance of which contract consti-
tutes the resale contract. The seller should be allowed to
make that designation as late as at trial. The seller's
designation should be accepted so long as the resale
goods are conforming to those required by the breached
contract. Only if the seller is not at "lost volume," and
the seller can be shown to have made a resale which could
not have been made except for the buyer's breach should
the seller be limited under section 2-706 to the "true" re-
sale contract.
2. Identified Resale
To date there is not sufficient case law to allow us to
regard as resolved the question of how to satisfy the re-
quirement of section 2-706(2) that the resale "be reason-
ably identified as referring to the broken contract." One
persuasive decision, for example, can be read as holding
that, in all cases in which the resold goods are conforming
to the breached contract, the resale contract has been rea-
than he would have been had the contract not been breached by the
amount of loss that he would have suffered on the disadvantageous
resale contract. This has been labeled the phenomenon of lost
volume.
Id. See generally, Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act
and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66, 80-87 (1965).
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sonably identified. 52 Another case, however, has specifi-
cally held that section 2-706(2) "requires the seller to
indicate, by some means, that the particular goods are be-
ing delivered to the new buyer as a result of the broken
contract. '5 3 The buyer had repudiated in February a con-
tract to purchase cottonseed oil. By letter of March 17,
the seller proposed four options for resolving the dispute,
including resale of the goods. Prior to the letter, in late
February, the seller had contracted to sell cottonseed oil
to another buyer. When a resolution of the dispute with
the breaching buyer did not occur, the seller decided to
use the refused oil to fulfill the existing contract with the
other buyer. The trial court denied the seller recovery on
the basis of the resale and relegated the seller to recovery
based on market price under section 2-708, because it
found that the seller had neither given notice of intention
to resell nor identified the cottonseed oil to the breached
contract. On appeal, the holding of the trial court could
have been upheld solely on the basis of the seller's failure
to give notice of intention to resell. The court, however,
expressly refused to resolve the case on this basis. The
court held that even if it was clear that the oil delivered
under the resale contract was that originally intended for
the breached contract, the seller could not recover under
section 2-706 because the seller had failed to take some
action to identify the resale contract to the breached
contract.
The court's decision was not well advised. There sim-
ply is no requirement in section 2-706(2) that the seller
take affirmative action to identify the resale to the
breached contract. The requirement is only that the re-
52 Action Time Carpets, Inc. v. Midwest Carpet Brokers, Inc. 271 N.W.2d 36,
40, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1103, 1108 (Minn. 1978).
53 Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Marubeni Alaska Seafoods, Inc., 23 Wash. App.
193, 596 P.2d 666, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 704, 706 (1979) (citing for
its holding R. Duesenberg & L. King, Sales & Bulk Transfers Under the U. C. C. in 3A
BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE § 13.05(4) in which the authors suggest the seller can
comply by some memorandum in his file or, even better, by notification to the
breaching buyer).
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sale "be reasonably identified" as referring to the breached
contract. If the goods involved in a resale contract are
clearly those intended for the breached contract, then
surely a reasonable identification between the two con-
tracts has been made. Unless a buyer is able to show
some legitimate interest worthy of protection, such as be-
ing required to pay penal damages, the court's analysis
represents an incorrect reading of the applicable Code
provisions and is against the grain of judicial decisions
which liberally allow the seller to use the resale formula
upon a showing that the resale was conducted in good
faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Better
reasoned decisions have found the identification require-
ment to be met if the goods involved in the resale contract
are conforming to those required by the breached
contract.54
Moreover, in at least one case, a seller was allowed to
recover under section 2-706 even though the buyer was
able to demonstrate that the goods involved in the resale
contract were not those identified to the breached
contract.55
In that case, the seller sold to the buyer 200,000
pounds of fifty percent lean navel trimmings which the
seller held in cold storage. Under the agreement, delivery
of the goods was to be by transmission of invoices and
warehouse receipts, the goods remaining in cold storage
with the seller. The seller delivered appropriate invoices
and warehouse receipts for 200,000 pounds of navel trim-
mings from lot 19700. Market value of navel trimmings
plumetted soon thereafter, and the buyer repudiated the
contract. The seller sued alleging alternative methods of
valuing its damages including, inter alia, the differentials
between the contract price and both the resale price of the
54 Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1,
10, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518, 529 (1980). See also Action Time Car-
pets, Inc. v. Midwest Carpet Brokers, Inc., 271 N.W.2d 36, 40, 24 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1103, 1108 (Minn. 1978).
55 Servbest Foods, 403 N.E.2d at 7-10.
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meat identified to the contract from lot 19700 and the re-
sale price of the first 200,000 pounds of navel trimmings
meeting the contract specifications which were sold fol-
lowing the buyer's repudiation. The seller testified that its
standard practice was to ship meat on the basis of storage
expiration date and argued that damages should be based
on the resale of the first 200,000 pounds cf navel trim-
mings sold subsequent to the repudiation, rather than of
the meat from lot 19700 identified to the breached con-
tract. The trial court agreed and so based the damages
award.56
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award,
saying that, although section 2-706 does refer to a resale
of "the goods concerned," a "narrow reading" of the sec-
tion was to be rejected "in light of the policy and intent
underpinning the Code and the concept of 'resale'. 57
The court suggested that the underlying purpose of sec-
tion 2-706 is to honor the seller's lost expectation by in-
suring that the resale price accurately reflects the market
value of the goods involved in the breached contract.
This would be the normal purpose of restricting resales to
identified goods. The court emphasized that the goods
involved were fungible 58 in nature and that the buyer had
introduced no evidence to suggest that the goods which
were the subject of the resale were not identical to those
contained in lot 19700 which were identified to the
contract.
The court further noted that its holding was consistent
with the allowance by section 2-706 of a resale of goods
which were not in existence or identified to the contract
prior to the breach. Most importantly, the court rejected
the buyer's argument that the resale was not reasonably
identified as referring to the broken contract as required
56 Id. at 6. The seller did not plead for recovery of the full unpaid contract
price. Id. On the facts, the goods had probably been accepted, and a price action
would have been an appropriate remedy.
57 Id. at 7.
58 See U.C.C. § 1-201(17) (1977).
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by section 2-706. The court said that this identification
requirement is met when the resale consists of goods
which are in conformity with the requirements of the
breached contract. The court said that any concern that a
seller will manipulate resale in order to obtain a particu-
larly high damage award goes, not to whether the resale is
identified to the contract, but rather to whether the resale
was commercially reasonable. The court found no evi-
dence of the seller's picking and choosing sales in order
to increase damages and noted that the resale involved
was conducted within a month of the buyer's repudiation,
involved the first sales made following the repudiation
and was conducted in accordance with the seller's stan-
dard practice of selling meats by the expiration dates on
the storage contracts.
The court's holding is consistent with the underlying
mitigation requirement of section 2-706 that the goods be
resold as soon as reasonably possible after the breach. To
require the seller to resell the specific goods identified to
the breached contract would also have required the seller
to violate its standard operating procedures and to keep
meat in cold storage longer than necessary. It is impor-
tant to note that the court's reasoning with respect to the
identification requirements in Section 2-706 holds true
for all cases in which the goods involved in the resale con-
tract are identical to those required by the breached con-
tract. So long as the resale goods are conforming and the
seller has introduced evidence generally that the resale
was made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner, the burden should rest with the buyer to show
the unreasonableness of the resale or that another sale
would more accurately reflect the damages incurred.
D. A Caveat
The provisions of section 2-706 have been applied not
only to resales of goods by aggrieved sellers following
breach by their respective buyers but also, by analogy, to
resales of investment securities and the like which are not
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governed by Article 2.59 Section 2-706 has also been ap-
plied in cases involving resales by buyers following breach
by their respective sellers. 60 The construction and appli-
cation by the courts of the provisions of section 2-706
should not vary in these kinds of cases from those involv-
ing resales of goods by aggrieved sellers, except that a
buyer who resells must account to the seller for any excess
over the amount of his security interest.6 1
On the other hand, section 2-706 has been applied in
numerous cases involving sales by secured creditors of
property of their debtors following repossession of the
collateral under Article 9 of the Code. Section 9-504 gov-
erns such sales and provides, with language identical to
that in section 2-706, that such sales must be conducted in
"a commercially reasonable manner." Section 9-504 fur-
ther provides that "[a]ny sale of goods is subject to the
Article on Sales (Article 2)."62 It has been persuasively
argued that one should be wary of placing undue reliance
on these Article 9 cases as defining the parameters of the
requirements of section 2-706 with respect to questions
such as notice of resale, good faith and commercial rea-
sonableness. 63 The potential for evil and abuse by se-
cured creditors in deficiency judgment cases following
repossession and sale of collateral at the proverbial dime-
on-the-dollar is well known and has over time fostered a
skeptical judicial attitude in such cases. 64 Further, such
cases often involve large institutionalized creditors
against financially strapped consumers. However, similar
-%9 See Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), alfd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972); Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 692 F.2d 455, 34
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1335 (7th Cir. 1982).
60 See U.C.C. §§ 2-711(3), 2-718(4) (1977).
I d. § 2-706(6) (1977); see id. § 2-711(3) (1977). See also infra notes 293-307
and accompanying text.
62 See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1977); see generally A & P Trucking v. Phil Long Ford, Inc.,
676 P.2d 1267, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1437 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
63 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 267 (2d ed. 1980).
See Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. S. & H. Distributing Co., 331 So. 2d 870,
19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 818 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
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situations are presented by the typical section 2-706 case
in which the seller resells. The case may well involve a
consumer, and, regardless, the potential for abusing the
resale privilege is equally present. Thus, although the
point of being careful in applying Article 9 cases to sec-
tion 2-706 is well taken, the standard in both classes of
cases is that of good faith and commercial reasonableness
to be determined by the facts and circumstances of a
given case. It is, after all, the buyer or the debtor, and not
the seller or the creditor, who is in breach of his obliga-
tion, and a deadbeat is a deadbeat regardless of whether
the one to whom he is indebted has the luxury of a secur-
ity interest or other collateral.
In suggesting that the Article 9 provisions on commer-
cial reasonableness in foreclosure sales, as well as the
cases construing them, are relevant to resales under sec-
tion 2-706, Professor Hawkland has cogently pointed out
that the applicable provisions in both articles of the Code
are predicated on the assumption that there will be a defi-
ciency following the resale or foreclosure sale.65 Accord-
ingly, the concept of commercial reasonableness in both
kinds of cases is to be judged primarily in terms of keep-
ing the deficiency to a reasonable minimum. As will be
discussed more fully,66 regardless of whether the action
arises under Article 9 or Article 2, the courts have gener-
ally assessed the standards of good faith and commercial
reasonableness under the facts of a given case in terms of
whether the particular seller used reasonable efforts to
obtain the best price possible on resale.
II. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
A. In General
Section 2-706(3) provides that where the resale is pri-
vate, the seller must give the buyer reasonable notice of
his intention to resell. Section 2-706(4) provides that
W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:02, at 299-300.
See infra notes 116-237 and accompanying text.
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where the resale is public, the seller must reasonably no-
tify the buyer of time and place of the resale unless the
goods are perishable or threaten to decline speedily in
value. Even in such instances, however, the requirements
of good faith and commercial reasonableness probably
would require notification to the buyer if notice could be
effectuated prior to the public sale.
The function of notice in the public resale situation is to
afford the buyer the opportunity to bid at the sale or to
encourage the attendance of other bidders. In the case
of a private resale, although the requirement itself is
clear, 68 the purpose of the notification is not. The pur-
pose may be no more than formally to advise the buyer
that the seller considers him in breach or repudiation and
is electing to substitute his remedies at law for the buyer's
performance under the breached contract.6 9  Hopefully,
the courts will not read compliance with the notice re-
quirement as binding the seller to the resale remedy if, at
trial, the seller is able to show damages in a greater
amount. For example, the goods may not be resellable
and the prospective resale may not occur. The seller
should then be entitled to an action for the full remaining
unpaid contract price. Or, the seller may unwittingly be
in a "lost volume" position at the time he gives notice of
intention to resell. If so, resale damages would not com-
pensate him, and he should be entitled to recover his lost
profit under section 2-708(2).7o
67 U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 8 (1977).
Id. Comment 8 to section 2-706 provides:
Where the resale is to be by private sale, subsection (3) requires that
reasonable notification of the seller's intention to resell must be
given to the buyer. The length of notification of a private sale de-
pends upon the urgency of the matter. Notification of the time and
place of this type of sale is not required.
Id.
69 See Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305, 311 (1953); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 313, comment (c) (1932).
70 This proposition is discussed more fully at text accompanying infra notes
269-293.
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B. The Seller Must Give
For both public and private resales, Section 2-706 pro-
vides that "the seller must give" the required notice.
Although the contrary has been suggested, 7' the provi-
sion should be read literally. Section 1-201(26) provides
that a person "gives" notice "by taking such steps as may
be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary
course whether or not such other actually comes to know
of it." Accordingly, although the seller must take reason-
able steps to give notice, it is not necessary that the notice
actually be received. Thus, in one case notice was sent by
certified mail, return receipt requested but was signed for
by the buyer's sister-in-law whose name was very similar
to that of the buyer. The buyer denied receipt of the no-
tice. The court held that notice had been properly given,
there being no requirement in section 2-706 that the no-
tice be received.72
On the other hand, the notice requirement may be sat-
isfied if the buyer has actual notice of the resale, even
though the notice has not been given by the seller. In a
case involving a public resale of oil drilling equipment,
notices- which were sent by certified mail to the buyer were
returned unclaimed. The resale had been well publicized
with notices sent to several thousand potential purchas-
ers, and the buyer acknowledged that he knew of the re-
sale. The court held the notice sufficient. 73 In this kind of
case, common sense and fairness prevail over the precise
wording of the statute.
It is not clear, however, whether the notice requirement
has been satisfied if the seller has not given notice but the
buyer, under the facts, should reasonably have known of
the resale. Section 1-201(25) provides that a person has
notice of a fact when "from all the facts and circumstances
71 See supra note 26, § 2-706:04, at 304.
72 Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62, 64,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 697, 700-01 (1970).
79 Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 442 F. Supp. 570, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 626, 631-32 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
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known to him at the time in question he has reason to
know that it exists." It has been held that where the
goods were purchased jointly by husband and wife, notice
of resale to the husband only might not be sufficient
under section 2-706. 7 4
C. Content of Notice
The content of the required notice varies depending
upon whether the resale is public or private. If the resale
is private, notice need be given only of "intention to re-
sell." Thus, where the evidence was uncontradicted at
trial that the seller advised the buyer following the buyer's
breach that it had a potential buyer for the goods in an-
other state, proof of notice of intention to resell was held
sufficient. Notice of the actual resale was not required.75
In another case, section 2-706 notice was held sufficient
when a buyer resold nonconforming goods, as permitted
by section 2-711(3), after advising the seller that "if you
do not give us instructions within a reasonable period of
time, we will sell the said steel for your account. ' 7 6
If the resale is public, however, the notice must specifi-
cally advise the buyer of the time and place of the resale.
Unless the goods are perishable or threaten to decline
speedily in value so as to make it impractical to give ad-
vance notice to the buyer, the buyer is entitled to the op-
portunity to bid at the resale and to solicit the attendance
of other bidders. Failure to allow these opportunities by
appropriate advance notice is fatal to the seller's recovery
under section 2-706. 7 7 It has been held, however, that
where the buyer was duly notified of the time and place of
a public resale and did not appear at the auction to pro-
7. Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854,
856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
75 Alco Standard Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co., 51 Ill. 2d 186, 281 N.E.2d 652, 653
10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 639 (1972).
76 North American Steel Corp. v. Siderius, 75 Mich. App. 391, 254 N.W.2d 899,
902, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 62 (1977).
77 See Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1154
(D.S.D. 1977).
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tect its interest, the buyer was not entitled to notice of a
second public resale of the goods remaining unsold at the
first resale.78 Whether the resale is public or private,
there is no requirement under the Code that the notice be
in writing or that any other formalities be met.
D. Consequences of Failure to Give Notice
The courts have strictly construed the notice require-
ments of section 2-706 and have held that the failure of
the seller to give the required notice bars recovery under
the section. 79  Failure to give the required notice, how-
ever, does not bar the seller from any other remedy.80 Ac-
cordingly, courts have held that the failure of the seller to
give notice under section 2-706 does not bar a damage
recovery under section 2-708,81 the seller's right of can-
cellation under section 2-703(6),2 the right of the seller
to stop delivery upon the buyer's insolvency under section
2-702, s 3 or a seller's right to recover in an action for the
price.8 4 If, however, the seller does not give the required
78 Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 442 F. Supp. 570, 576, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
79 Foxco Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 694
(5th Cir. 1979); Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 446 (10th Cir. 1967); Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1154 (D.S.D. 1977); In re Greenwood, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1966); Wood v. Downing, 243 Ark. 120,
418 S.W.2d 800, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 733 (1967); Portal Galleries,
Inc. v. Tomar Products, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 523, 302 N.Y.S.2d 871, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1047 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
o See Foxco Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 694 (5th Cir. 1979); U.C.C.§ 2-706, comment 2 (1977).
- Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Marubeni Alaska Seafoods, Inc., 23 Wash. App.
193, 596 P.2d 666, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 704 (1979); B & R Textile
Corp. v. Paul Rothman Indus., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996 (N.Y. App.
Term 1979); Miller v. Belk, 23 N.C. App. 1, 207 S.E.2d 792, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 627 (1974). The price of the resale contract may itself be evidence of
market price under section 2-708(1). See Quattlebaum v. Schutt, 27 Agric. Dec.
242, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 370 (U.S. Dept. of Agric. 1968).
82 Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 909, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 388 (N.D. 1975).
o3 Indussa Corp. v. Reliable Stainless Steel Supply Co., 369 F. Supp. 976, 978,
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 709 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
84 Wolpert v. Foster, 312 Minn. 526, 254 N.W.2d 348, 352, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 516 (1977).
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notice, it matters not that the resale was otherwise com-
mercially reasonable. 5 And it has been held that a buyer
is entitled to a directed verdict for lack of notice unless
the seller has pleaded and proved an alternate measure of
recovery.86
At least one court has opined that wherc the goods
were purchased jointly by husband and wife, notice of re-
sale to the husband only might not be sufficient under
section 2-706.87 On the other hand, where part of the
goods were resold prior to notice of intention to resell
and part resold thereafter, an award of damages based
solely on the resales subsequent to notice has been up-
held."' Further, a failure to give the required notice may
in itself, or in combination with other factors, render the
resale commercially unreasonable. 9 For example, in one
case the buyer rightfully rejected nonconforming jackets,
stored them, and awaited the seller's instructions as to
their disposal.90 When such instructions were not forth-
coming, the buyer resold them over a three-year period."
85 Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270, 275, 20
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 117 (1976). Cf., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
of Chicago v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 692 F.2d 455, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1335 (7th Cir. 1982) (notice requirements satisfied by public resale on a national
securities exchange); Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp.
341, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1972) (resale on national securities exchange afforded defendant sufficient
notice).
86 Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. Hailing, 205 N.W.2d 736, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 381 (Iowa 1973). Even a seller who has failed to provide an
alternate measure of recovery may be able to bootstrap success by convincing the
trial court that the invalid resale price is sufficient evidence of market value upon
which to base a recovery under section 2-708. The law normally does not require
general damages to be pled with specificity. See B & R Textile Corp. v. Paul Roth-
man Indus., 101 Misc. 2d 98, 420 N.Y.S.2d 609, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
996 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).
87 Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854,
856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
88 Action Time Carpets, Inc. v. Midwest Carpet Brokers, Inc., 271 N.W.2d 36,
40, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1103 (Minn. 1978).
8- Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 90 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109, 115, 35 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130 (1982).
- Eska Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co., 483 F. Supp. 1228, 29 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 534 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
91 Id.
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The buyer, however, did not notify the seller of the re-
sales and failed to render an accounting to the seller for
their proceeds.9 2 The court held that the buyer was liable
to the seller for the proceeds, with interest, after deduc-
tion of legitimate expenses incurred.9 3 Further, because
the buyer had failed to notify the seller and to maintain
accurate records of the resales, all uncertainties as to
amounts would be resolved against the buyer.94
E. Notice Excused
The notice requirements of section 2-706 are strict and
rarely have been excused by the courts. The requirement
is that notice be given, not that it be received. Thus,
where the seller sent notice of resale properly addressed
to the buyer by certified mail, return receipt requested,
the buyer was held properly notified even though he de-
nied receipt of the notice.95 If the buyer has actual knowl-
edge of the proposed resale or indicates to the seller that
he wishes the goods resold, formal notice from the seller
may be dispensed with. Thus, in one case formal notice
was excused, even though the seller's notices sent by cer-
tified mail were returned unclaimed, where the buyer ad-
mitted actual knowledge of the proposed public resale. 96
In another case, notice was excused where the evidence
reflected numerous conversations between the buyer and
the seller, in which the seller urged the buyer to take and
pay for the goods. The buyer consistently maintained
that he was not obligated to do so under the contract and
advised the seller to sell the goods elsewhere.97 Further,




95 Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62, 64,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 697 (1970). Receipt had been signed for by the
buyer's sister-in-law, whose name was very similar to that of the buyer. Id.
- Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 442 F. Supp. 570, 575-76, 23
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
97 Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 780, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568
(Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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fled of a public resale and did not acknowledge the notice
or attend the resale, the seller was not obligated to notify
the buyer of a subsequent public resale of the goods re-
maining unsold at the first resale.98
Every rule has its exception, and it has been consist-
ently held that notice of resale is not necessary when sec-
tion 2-706 is applied by analogy to a resale of securities
on a national security exchange. 99 In one such case, the
court said:
Section 2-706(4)(b) . . . in particular requires that
where there is a resale at a public sale, the seller must give
the buyer reasonable notice of the time and place of re-
sale. Official Comment 8 to § 2-706 explains that this was
added to assure the buyer of a fair sale by giving him the
"opportunity to bid or to secure the attendance of other
bidders." Here, the purpose of notification has been ful-
filled. Unlike in situations contemplated by the Code, the
resales in this case were made on the national securities
exchange, a market clearly fair to the buyer. Prior notice
to the defendant would not have given it any greater op-
portunity to attend or purchase the securities. Provisions
necessary to protect the buyer of goods are not always
necessary to protect the buyer of listed securities. The
purpose underlying § 2-706(4)(b) was fulfilled and [the
court] cannot rule that the notification provision was
violated. 'o
It remains to be seen whether the court's reasoning with
respect to securities is equally applicable to a resale of
commodities or other futures which are governed directly
by Article 2 and section 2-706.
At least one court has held that the failure of the seller
98 Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 442 F. Supp. 570, 576, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
99 See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
692 F.2d 455, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1335 (7th Cir. 1982); Bache & Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972).
Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 352, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248, 261 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1972).
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to give notice of resale is an affirmative defense of the
buyer.'0 ' Although this holding is of doubtful merit in
most jurisdictions,' 0 2 its effect is that the failure of the
seller to give notice of resale is excused in any case in
which the buyer fails to plead and prove the failure to give
notice of resale.
F. Burden of Proof; Burden of Pleading
It is a fundamental rule of the law of damages that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof as to all aspects of his
entitlement to damages. The defendant has the burden of
proof with respect to matters in avoidance of damages or
in mitigation thereof.0 3 Since the giving of notice of re-
sale is a condition precedent to a seller's recovery under
section 2-706, it would seem clear that the seller has the
burden of proving that the required notice was given.
There is nothing in the Code to the contrary.' 0 4 An early
case, however, held that the failure to give notice under
section 2-706 was an affirmative defense which, unless
pleaded and proved by the buyer-defendant, was deemed
waived. 105 On appeal, the supreme court of the jurisdic-
tion held that it was not necessary to review the lower
court's determination regarding the burden of pleading
and proof because the evidence was undisputed at trial
that the buyer had received notice of resale.' 0 6 A later
1o, Alco Standard Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co., 132 11. App. 2d 24, 265 N.E.2d 507,
509, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 808 (1970).
102 See Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., 541 S.W.2d 706, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAw OF DAMAGES § 14, at 53-55 (1935). See also infra notes 103-112 and accompa-
nying text.
103 See generally D.DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.7, 188-91
(1973).
- See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977). See also Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1154 (D.S.D. 1977); Anheuser v. Oswald Refracto-
ries Co., 541 S.W.2d 706, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 672 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (burden of proof of notice of resale under section 2-706 on seller).
,05 Alco Standard Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co., 132 Il1. App. 2d 24, 265 N.E.2d 507,
8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 808 (1970).
o6 Alco Standard Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co., 51 111. 2d 186, 281 N.E. 2d 652, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 639 (1972).
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case from the same jurisdiction has interpreted the
supreme court's holding to mean that, where notice of in-
tent to resell has been proved, it is not fatal that the seller
has not pled notice in his complaint. 10 7
The general rule of law is that the burden of pleading
and the burden of proof should rest on the same party.
Notice of resale is a condition precedent to a seller's re-
covery under section 2-706, and the usual rule of practice
is that a claimant must plead and prove that he has met all
conditions precedent to his cause. Modern pleading prac-
tice, however, allows a plaintiff to allege generally that all
conditions precedent have been met and does not require
specific allegation of particular conditions.'1 8 Accord-
ingly, one court has held that, although it was not "insen-
sible" to the fact that some courts have viewed lack of
notice under section 2-706 as an affirmative defense which
must be pleaded by the defendant or waived, the burden
of pleading notice should rest on the seller. 0 9 The court
held, however, that the seller was required only to allege
generally the performance of all conditions precedent to
its recovery and was not required to plead the giving of
107 Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1,
29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518 (1980).
108 See generally CLARK ON CODE PLEADING § 45 (2d ed. 1947); 9 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE §§ 2483-2489, 2537 (3d ed. 1940). Rule 9(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence
of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to assert that all conditions
precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of per-
formance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with
particularity.
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(c). Rule 3015(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
provides:
The performance or occurrence of a condition precedent in a con-
tract need not be pleaded. A denial of performance or occurrence
shall be made specifically and with particularity. In case of such de-
nial, the party relying on the performance or occurrence shall be
required to prove on the trial only such performance or occurrence
as shall have been so specified.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3015(a) (McKinney 1974). These rules would require the de-
fendant to allege specifically that the notice of resale had not been given.
- Twin Bridges Truck City v. Hailing, 205 N.W.2d 736, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 381 (Iowa 1973).
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notice in detail.1 0 In another case, it was held that where
notice of intent to resell had been given, the failure of the
seller to plead notice in his complaint was not fatal."'
However, in a related context, other courts have held that
the notice of breach requirement for buyers under section
2-607(3) is a condition precedent, and the failure to
plead it bars the buyer's claim." 2 Until the law in this
area is more settled, the seller's attorney is best advised to
plead that notice of resale has been given or, at least, that
all requirements of section 2-706 have been satisfied.
G. Waiver of Notice
Following breach, sellers of goods wish to get the goods
back in the market at the best possible price and with the
least possible inconvenience. It is understandable that a
seller might also want to accomplish all of this without
suffering the alternative of either advising the buyer in ad-
vance of his intentions or limiting his remedial recourse if
he does not do so. A possible way of avoiding the alterna-
tive is by provision in the agreement between the parties
to the effect that, if the buyer breaches, the seller may re-
sell the goods with or without notice to the buyer, and
charge the buyer for the differential between the contract
price and the resale price." 3 Section 1-102(3) of the
Code allows the parties a broad-based permission to vary
provisions of the Code by agreement except when vari-
ance is expressly prohibitied by the Code and "except that
the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care" may not be disclaimed. The Code does not ex-
pressly prohibit a waiver of notice of resale by agreement.
110 Id.
III Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1,
29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518 (1980).
1' See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 25 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 65 (6th Cir. 1978); L.A. Green Seed Companies of Arkan-
sas v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
105 (1969).
11 Such a provision would not limit the availability of remedies to the seller.
U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (1977) provides that "resort to a remedy as provided is op-
tional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive .. "
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However, at least one court has speculated that such waiv-
ers may be invalid because they disclaim obligations of
"reasonableness and care."'' 4
Nevertheless, a resale can be commercially reasonable
and in good faith, even though the buyer does not have
advance notice of it. This is particularly true with respect
to private resales in which the notice requirement func-
tions as little more than advice to the buyer that the seller
considers him in breach and intends to pursue his reme-
dies at law. Accordingly, waiver of notice of resale provi-
sions should not be invalidated per se but instead their
validity should be assessed both at the time of the making
of the contract under the Code's general policing provi-
sions on good faith and unconscionability, 1 5 and after
breach in terms of whether a resale without notice to the
buyer would be commercially reasonable under all the
facts and circumstances. Section 2-706 certainly invali-
dates as the basis for a measurement of damages any re-
sale which is commercially unreasonable, regardless of
whether notice has been given to the buyer.
III. GOOD FAITH AND COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS
A. In General
The critical requisite to recovery under section 2-706 is
that the resale be conducted "in good faith and in a com-
mercially reasonable manner." In the words of one court,
the provision "requires that every aspect of the resale in-
cluding the method, manner, time, place, and terms must
be commercially reasonable." '" 6 Although section 2-706,
particularly with respect to public resales, does provide
some specifics as to reasonableness, 1 7 "no clear-cut or
114 Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 697 (1970).
115 See U.C.C. §§ 1-203 & 2-302 (1977).
116 McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 424, 541 S.W.2d
911,913, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110, 112 (1976).
117 See infra notes 138-162 and accompanying text.
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easily identifiable rule""' 8 can be stated and "what is a
commercially reasonable manner depends on the nature
of the goods," 9 the condition of the market and other cir-
cumstances in the case and cannot be measured by any
legal yardstick or divided into degrees."'' 2 0  We are told
that "[t]his standard of honesty and fair dealing is the
foundation upon which the Code was drafted"' 2 ' and that
"[w]hile it is a vague concept subject to a wide variety of
interpretations from case to case, its flexibility is a feature
which is needed by any Code to make it work in prac-
tice."' 122 Certainly local custom, usage, and trade practice
should be followed, 23 and it has been suggested by sound
authority that the opinion of the breaching buyer be con-
sulted as well as that of other sellers in the trade. 24
Although commercial reasonableness is the "ultimate
test," it is a "pragmatic test," a "practical test," and it is
broader than the "reasonable care and judgment" stan-
dard under the old Uniform Sales Act and should not be
treated as a "legalistic restriction."'' 25
118 Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 352, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248, 260 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1972).
119 See Broglie v. MacKay-Smith, 541 F.2d 453, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 114 (4th Cir. 1976) (inquiuing into the vexed question of what is a commer-
cially reasonable manner in which to resell a lame horse).
120 Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 12, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 977, 989 (4th Cir. 1971).
121 Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1,
11, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518, 530 (1980). See also R. ANDERSON, AN-
DERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203:1 & 2 (1961); R. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 523 (1970).
122 Id.
23 See United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1488 (5th Cir. 1977); Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1179 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
directed that this opinion not be considered as precedent or authority and that it
not be published in the Pacific Reporter).
124 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:02 (1982).
125 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus., 280 F. Supp. 698, 4 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 977, 996 (Is.D. Pa. 1968), affd, 398 F.2d 310, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565 (3d Cir. 1968); U.C.C. § 2-706 comments 2, 4 & 5
(1977).
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1. Question of Fact
Given the extremely nebulous nature of the issue, it is
not surprising to find the courts in near unanimous ac-
cord that the issue is one for the jury.126 In fact, it has
been held reversible error for the question of commercial
reasonableness under section 2-706 to be decided by the
trial court as a matter of law. 127 Nevertheless, all so-called
fact questions involve both questions of law and fact, and
a seller's conduct in a given case may be so bizarre, outra-
geous or questionable that the trial court can properly de-
cide the issue against him as a matter of law.' 28 Thus, in a
case involving a merchant seller of bulldozers who was
well aware that the bulldozer market was in decline due to
a recession in the construction business and high fuel
prices, the court held that the seller's failure to make any
126 United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1488 (5th Cir. 1977); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 977 (4th Cir. 1971); Sierra Creek Ranch, Inc. v.J. I.
Case, 634 P.2d 458, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777 (Nev. 1981); Action
Time Carpets, Inc. v. Midwest Carpet Brokers, Inc., 271 N.W.2d 36, 24 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1103 (Minn. 1978); Pantsmaker, Inc. v. Orbit Mfg. Co., 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 103 (N.Y. App. Term 1981); Symonds v. Adler Res-
taurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1179 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971)
(the Oklahoma Supreme Court has directed that this opinion not be considered as
precedent or authority and that it not be published in the Pacific Reporter);
Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966).
12 United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1488 (5th Cir. 1977). Contra McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 650 Ark.
422, 541 S.W.2d 911, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976) (fourteen
month delay by seller before attempting to resell was commercially unreasonable
as a matter of law).
128 A good sampling of diverse fact situations, with careful opinions worth read-
ing, is presented by the following cases: Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592
F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1979) (not commer-
cially reasonable); California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1007 (6th Cir. 1969) (questionable whether commercially
reasonable); Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 441 F. Supp. 570, 23
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (commercially reasonable);
Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 90 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 130 (1982) (not commercially reasonable); Servbest Foods, Inc. v.
Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 518 (1980) (commercially reasonable); Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Mar-
kos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (questionable
whether commercially reasonable).
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effort to resell the bulldozer for over one year was com-
mercially unreasonable as a matter of law.' 2 9 On the
other hand, the conduct of the seller may be so clearly in
good faith and shining with reasonableness that the trial
court may find it commercially reasonable as a matter of
law. ' 30
2. Good Faith
Read literally, section 2-706 requires not only that the
resale be conducted in a commercially reasonable man-
ner, but that it be entered into in good faith as well. This
requirement is akin to the Code's general requirement of
good faith in the performance and enforcement of con-
tracts.'' Good faith is defined to mean "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned."'' 32 With respect
to merchants, Article 2 of the Code provides that good
faith "means honesty in fact and the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." 133 In light of these definitions, it is obvious that
the Code's concept of commercial reasonableness is at
least as broad as its concept of good faith. Although good
faith is perhaps a more subjective concept than commer-
cial reasonableness, the latter certainly includes the for-
mer. Accordingly, in any case in which the seller has not
acted in good faith in the conduct of the resale, the resale
should be held to be commercially unreasonable. And, in
such cases, the broader concept furnishes the more cer-
tain basis for decision.
The courts have not dealt definitively with the concept
of good faith in the conduct of resales under section 2-
- McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911,
20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976).
-so See Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972).
'3 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977). Section 1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment." Id
13 Id § 1-201(19).
,- d § 2-103(1)(b).
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706. They have instead tied good faith to their discus-
sions of commercial reasonableness. A case in point in-
volved an attempt by the plaintiff to establish as a
commercially reasonable resale a fictitious "wash sale" in-
volving a paper transaction in which the seller sold goods
to, and subsequently purchased them from, a buyer whom
he controlled.134 In refusing to allow the resale as a basis
for computing damages, the court said that resale was a
"striking example of commercial unreasonableness that
suggests bad faith"'' 35 and that the "commercial unrea-
sonableness is obvious."' 13
6
The discussion below will follow the lead of the courts
by focusing primarily on commercial reasonableness
rather than on good faith. Any party litigant, after all,
would no doubt prefer his conduct labeled unreasonable
rather than without "honesty in fact."
B. Specific Requirements
As has been previously discussed, 37 section 2-706 re-
quires that notice of resale be given whether the resale is
public or private. Since the only requirement in private
resales is notification of intention to resell, 38 there is only
a tenuous relationship at best between the required notice
and the commercial reasonableness of the resale. Cer-
tainly a private resale could be in good faith and commer-
cially reasonable even though the seller overlooked the
notice requirement. With respect to public resales, how-
ever, the relationship between notice and commercial
reasonableness is more direct. Unless the goods are per-
ishable or threaten to decline rapidly in value, the seller
must notify the buyer reasonably of the time and place of
the resale. 39 The purpose is to allow the buyer an oppor-
134 Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1979).
-, Coast Trading, 592 F.2d at 1080.
136 Id. at 1081.
1.7 See supra notes 67-115 and accompanying text.
isa U.C.C. § 2-706(3) (1977).
,s" Id. § 2-706((4)(b).
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tunity to bid at the resale or to persuade other bidders to
attend. 40 If the required notice is not given, the resale
will probably be rendered commercially unreasonable.' 4'
The Code's resale provision also requires that the re-
sale be reasonably identified as referring to the breached
contract. This requirement has been discussed previ-
ously.' 42 In the case of a public resale, three additional
requirements for commercial reasonableness are specified
by section 2-706.' 41 The failure of any of these require-
ments should render the public resale commercially un-
reasonable. 4 4 First, except where there is an established
market for the public sale of futures in the particular
goods, only identified goods can be resold. 145 This re-
quirement is related both to the general requirement that
the resale be reasonably identified as referring to the bro-
ken contract and to the Code's theory of compensation.
To be identified, the goods must be in existence, that is,
complete. 46 If the goods have not been completed and
identified to the broken contract, the resale contract logi-
cally cannot be identified to the broken contract. Further,
if the goods have not been completed, the only correct
compensatory formula under the Code's scheme is that of
lost profit plus reasonable overhead under section 2-
708(2). 47 Goods which are not both existing and identi-
fied are termed "future" goods. 148 If the goods are "fu-
ture" they generally cannot be resold at a public sale.
However, in the words of one commentator: "Where
there is a recognized market for public sale of such future
140 See id. § 2-706 comment 8. Even in cases in which the goods are perishable
or their value is rapidly declining, the notice would no doubt be required if it
could be reasonably effectuated prior to the resale.
141 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions
to the general rule.
142 See supra notes 18-56 and accompanying text.
143 U.C.C. § 2-706(4) (1977).
144 See id. § 2-706 comment 2.
145 Id. § 2-704(4)(a).
146 See id. § 2-401. See also id. § 2-704(2) allowing the aggrieved seller, follow-
ing breach, to complete the goods and identify them to the breached contract.
,47 Id. § 2-708(2). See generally, Anderson, supra note 13 at 13-14.
148 Id. § 2-105(2).
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goods, as in the common case of most commodities, there
is no good reason to deny the seller his resale remedy,
simply because the goods underlying the commodity re-
sale are not yet in existence." 149 Section 2-706(4)(a) of
the Code provides for the appropriate exception. 50
Second, if one is reasonably available, the usual place
or market for public sale must be used.' 5 ' The Code envi-
sions that the seller may be required to transport the
goods a considerable distance to reach such a market. 52
In such cases, of course, the transportation costs would be
recoverable by the seller as incidental damages under sec-
tion 2-710.153 Comment 9 to section 2-706 explains the
matter:
Since there would be no reasonable prospect of competi-
tive bidding elsewhere, subsection (4) requires that a pub-
lic resale "must be made at a usual place or market for
public sale if one is reasonably available;" i.e., a place or
market which prospective bidders may reasonably be ex-
pected to attend. Such a market may still be "reasonably
available" under this subsection, though at a considerable
distance from the place where the goods are located. In
such a case the expense of transporting the goods for re-
sale is recoverable from the buyer as part of the seller's
incidental damages under subsection (1). However, the
question of availability is one of commercial reasonable-
ness in the circumstances and if such "usual" place or
market is not reasonably available, a duly advertised pub-
lic resale may be held at another place if it is one which
prospective bidders may reasonably be expected to attend,
as distinguished from a place where there is no demand
whatsoever for goods of the kind.' 54
Third, the goods must either be "within the view" of
the bidders at the public resale or the notification of the
149 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:05.
1- U.C.C. § 2-706(4)(a) (1977).
- Id. § 2-706(4)(b).
152 Id. § 2-706 comment 9.
1 4 I d .
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resale must have stated the place where the goods are lo-
cated and have provided for their reasonable inspection in
advance of the auction.' 55 This requirement is obviously
consistent with the underlying purpose of section 2-706
of generating the best possible resale price. Implicit in
this requirement is the necessity of adequately publicizing
the public resale so as to attract the largest number of po-
tential purchasers reasonably possible. The notification
must be commercially reasonable and should contain the
time and place of the auction, a suitably enticing descrip-
tion of the goods for sale, and any special rules under
which the auction is to be conducted, such as whether or
not a minimum bid is required or whether the goods are
put up without reserve.
156
Local custom and practice should be followed as to
whether the notification of auction is to be posted at the
courthouse or in other public places 57 or simply sent to
15- Id. § 2-706(4)(c).
156 See id. § 2-328(3). Because a public resale under section 2-706 means a sale
by auction, the Code's rules with respect to auctions must be followed. These
rules are found in section 2-328 which provides:
(1) In a sale by auction if goods are put up in lots each lot is the
subject of a separate sale.
(2) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces
by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner. Where a
bid is made while the hammer is falling in acceptance of a prior bid
the auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bidding or declare
the goods sold under the bid on which the hammer was falling.
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit terms
put up without reserve. In an auction with reserve the auctioneer
may withdraw the goods at any time until he announces completion
of the sale. In an auction without reserve, after the auctioneer calls
for bids on an article or lot, that article or lot cannot be withdrawn
unless no bid is made within a reasonable time. In either case a bid-
der may retract his bid until the auctioneer's announcement of com-
pletion of the sale, but a bidder's retraction does not revive any
previous bid.
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's behalf
or the seller makes or procures such a bid, and notice has not been
given that liberty for such bidding is reserved, the buyer may at his
option avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of the last good
faith bid prior to the completion of the sale. This subsection shall
not apply to any bid at a forced sale.
Id.
'57 See Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
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potential purchasers by mail. 118 Adequate publicity of a
public resale is necessary for the resale to be held com-
mercially reasonable. For example, in one case the court
held a public resale to be commercially unreasonable as a
matter of law where the advertisement of the resale con-
tained neither the correct date nor the location of the auc-
tion and failed to state that a minimum bid would be
required. ' 59
In another case, it was held that a public resale would
not be in good faith if it was shown at trial that, although
the seller had advertised the resale at a particular time, a
prospective bidder was advised prior to that time that the
sale had already taken place, when in fact the goods were
subsequently auctioned to the seller at a lower price than
the prospective purchaser had been willing to pay.160 On
the other hand, a simple advertisement in the New York
Times has been held under the circumstances to be suffi-
cient public notification of the proposed resale.
16
In another case, involving the public resale of a mobile
home, the notice of sale was posted on the mobile home
in Tuscon, as well as in three places in Phoenix, and other
mobile home dealers were invited to bid. The testimony
at trial was to the effect that this procedure was consistent
with general practices of mobile home dealers in the lo-
cale in repossession sales. The notice of sale specified the
location of the goods for viewing, because they were not
to be available for such purpose at auction. The resale
ghan) 1179 (Okla. App. Ct. 1971) (local commercial custom, usage and practice
followed by posting notice in three public places, including the bulletin board in
the local courthouse) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court has directed that this opin-
ion not be considered as precedent or authority and that it not be published in the
Pacific Reporter).
158 See Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 442 F. Supp. 570, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (notice sent by certified mail).
159 California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1007 (6th Cir. 1969).
-o Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
I6 Cohn v. Fisher, 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 372 (1972).
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was held to be commercially reasonable.' 6 2
C. Specific Allowances
Section 2-706 anticipates and specifically allows several
courses of action which the seller may pursue in con-
ducting the resale. Subsection (2) provides that: (1) the
resale may be public or private; (2) an existing contract or
contract to sell may be identified as the resale contract;
and (3) the goods may be resold as a unit or in parcels.
Further, at a public sale the seller may bid for and buy the
goods. 163 The provision for using as a resale contract a
contract to sell is consistent with the provision in section
2-704 that the aggrieved seller may "treat as the subject of
resale goods which have demonstrably been intended for
the particular contract even though those goods are unfin-
ished."' 64 If the seller identifies an existing contract, one
into which he has already entered, as the resale contract,
he is by definition in a "lost volume" situation, and the
resale formula for damages will leave him less than whole
by the amount of profit he could have made on the resale
contract. 65 The matters of a seller's right to complete
goods after breach and of identification of the resale con-
tract have been discussed previously. 66
Regardless of the specific permission given a seller's
course of action, section 2-706 qualifies the permit with
the provision "every aspect of the sale including the
method, manner, time, place and terms must be commer-
162 Gulf Homes Inc. v. Goubeaux, 602 P.2d 815, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
163 U.C.C. § 2-706(4)(d) (1977).
64 Id. § 2-105(2). Section 2-105 provides that: "[g]oods must be both existing
and identified before any interest in them can pass. Goods which are not both
existing and identified are 'future' goods. A purported present sale of future
goods or any interest therein operates as a contract to sell." See also, Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 629 F.2d 1118, 30
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996 (5th Cir. 1980) (no need for goods to be in
existence at the time of breach for section 2-706 to be applicable).
,65 See supra note 13.
166 See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text. See generally, Servbest Foods,
Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 518 (1980).
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cially reasonable."'' 67 Accordingly, in choosing between a
public or private resale, or whether to resell the goods as
a unit or in parcels, or whether to complete the goods and
identify them to the breached contract, the seller must
chart his course of action in good faith and with commer-
cial resonableness.168
1. Public vs. Private Resale
It has been held that section 9-504 and, by analogy, sec-
tion 2-706 do not allow the seller an absolute option in
choosing between a public or private sale. The choice
must be made on the basis of which of the two is the more
commercially reasonable. 69 Comment 4 to section 2-706
indicates that the choice is allowed "so as to realize as
high a price as possible in the circumstances" and pro-
vides that "in choosing between a public and private sale
the character of the goods must be considered and rele-
vant trade practices and usages must be observed."' 170
In one case, the trial court's decision upholding a public
auction sale as commercially reasonable was reversed, the
court on appeal stating that a private sale was probably
preferable under the circumstances. 17 The seller admit-
ted that it usually handled such matters by private sale,
and the evidence was that the decision to hold a public
auction was made only two days after it had taken posses-
sion of the property. Further, contrary to the seller's
usual practice, no appraisal was made as to the value of
the property and potential private purchasers were not
contacted. Relevant trade practices and usages usually in-
cluded a search for potential private purchasers. There
was evidence that at least two items could have been sold
167 U.C.C. § 2-706(2) (1977).
1- U.C.C. § 2-706.
169 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus., 280 F. Supp. 698, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 977 (E.D. Pa.), affid, 398 F.2d 310, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 565 (3d Cir. 1968).
170 U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 4 (1977).
171 United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1488 (5th Cir. 1977).
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separately at a higher price. Further, there was evidence
in the record that the seller bargained unreasonably with
a potential purchaser who was considering making an of-
fer substantially higher than the amount realized at auc-
tion. It was also alleged that the value received at the
public sale was substantially less than market value. The
case was remanded for a new trial. 7 2 It is possible that if
the seller chooses a public resale, but fails to comply with
one of the technical requirements of section 2-706(4) with
respect to such a sale, the resale may nevertheless be up-
held as a private resale if it is commercially reasonable on
the whole. 73
2. As a Unit or in Parcels
It is generally true that goods can be resold at a higher
total price individually rather than in quantity parcels or
lots. Further, the fact that the seller has made numerous
individual sales to various customers at a variety of prices
is strong indication that the sales were at arms-length and
commercially reasonable transactions. 174 Nevertheless,
section 2-706 contemplates and permits quantity resales
where the situation warrants. The intent is to enable the
seller to obtain the best price possible as soon as possible.
Individual sales usually take time and entail storage and
handling costs which are chargeable to the breaching
buyer as incidental damages under section 2-710. Quan-
tity sales mitigate such damages, and the Code, accord-
ingly, allows the seller to deviate from the terms of the
breached contract to effectuate such sales. Comment 6 to
section 2-706 provides that "[t]he purpose of subsection
(2) being to enable the seller to dispose of the goods to
the best advantage, he is permitted in making the resale to
172 Id.
17' See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:06. But see Meadowbrook Nat'l
Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (lack of
good faith in conducting a public resale held to invalidate the resale price as a
basis for measuring damages).
174 See Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 83 Il1. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d
1, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518 (1980).
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depart from the terms and conditions of the original con-
tract for sale to any extent 'commercially reasonable' in
the circumstances."'' 5 Thus, a resale by lot in a public
auction has been upheld in the teeth of allegations by the
buyer that higher prices would have been obtained by in-
dividual sales. The court said that, although the seller was
obligated to obtain the highest price reasonably available,
the buyer had not presented sufficient evidence that the
resale was not in "good faith." In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, the amount received at the resale would
be presumed to be the best obtainable. 7 6 In a related
context, however, it has been termed "questionable"
whether a private resale at a wholesale price would consti-
tute a commercially reasonable disposal of goods which
had been sold to the buyer at a retail contract price. 77
3. Seller May Buy
Section 2-706(4)(d) provides that the seller may buy the
goods resold at public sale. Comment 9 explains that
"[t]he provision of paragraph (d) of subsection (4) per-
mitting the seller to bid and, of course, to become the
purchaser, benefits the original buyer by tending to in-
crease the resale price and thus decreasing the damages
he will have to pay." 178 The presumption is, of course,
that the auction itself is held in good faith and conducted
in a commercially reasonable manner. When this is ap-
parently the case, the price paid by the seller at the auc-
tion has been allowed to form the basis for measuring his
damages. 79 On the other hand, where the resale itself is
75 U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 6 (1977).
176 Wurlitzer Co. v. Oliver, 334 F. Supp. 1009, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
367 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
177 California Airmotive Corp. v.Jones, 415 F.2d 554, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1007 (6th Cir. 1969).
178 U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 9 (1977).
1' Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1179 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1971) (seller purchased for $800 specially built goods which were origi-
nally contracted to be sold for $3600) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court has directed
that this case not be considered as precedent or authority and that it not be pub-
lished in the Pacific Reporter).
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commercially unreasonable, either because it was delayed
too long18 0 or because the attendance of a prospective
purchaser was discouraged in bad faith,18 1 the price paid
by the purchasing seller may not be used to compute
damages under section 2-706. Indeed, the defects in the
reasonableness of the public resale may have been calcu-
lated for the purpose of allowing the seller to purchase
the goods at a particularly attractive price without com-
petitive pressure from other bidders or inflating the
seller's subsequent damage claim.
There is no express authorization in section 2-706 for
the seller to purchase the goods at a private resale. Such
a resale would involve nothing more than a paper transac-
tion and would almost certainly be held to be commer-
cially unreasonable. In the Coast Trading case mentioned
above, involving a fictitious "wash sale,"' 18 2 the court em-
phasized that it was dealing with a private resale and that
the resale raised the question of a bad faith attempt to
inflate the seller's damage claim. However, if the resale is
made by the buyer to the seller, or by the seller to himself
with the buyer's acquiescence, as a partial settlement of
the seller's damage claim, the resale should be upheld as
commercially reasonable. In this kind of situation, the
seller must be quite careful to avoid an accord and satis-
faction by properly reserving his rights to pursue later his
damage claim. 183
D. The Best Possible Price; Mitigation
Other than the specific restrictions and allowances dis-
cussed above, section 2-706 gives no help as to the mean-
ing of "commercial reasonableness" in the resale context.
The Code nowhere defines the phrase. It has been sug-
-8 Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d
580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57 (1971).
1,' Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Markos, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 854
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
182 Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1978).
183 See U.C.C. § 1-207 (1977).
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gested that commercial reasonableness should be judged
in terms of whether the resale price approximates the
market price at the time of the buyer's breach or
repudiation:
The object of the resale is simply to determine exactly the
seller's damages. These damages are the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price at the time
and place when performance should have been made by
the buyer. The object of the resale in such a case is to
determine what the market price in fact was. Unless the
resale is made at about the time when performance was
due it will be of slight probative value, especially if the
goods are of a kind which fluctuate rapidly in value, to
show what the market price actually was at the only time
which is legally important.18 4
This analysis is a reflection of pre-Code law, under which
resale price was not generally available as a basis for com-
puting damages but was restricted in its use to evidence of
market value.
Section 2-706, however, changes all of that by establish-
ing damages based on resale as a generally available in-
dependent remedy. 8 5 If the seller has conducted a
proper resale, it matters not that the unassailable or un-
controverted evidence establishes that the market price at
the time of the buyer's breach differs from the resale
price. s6 Any disparity between market price and resale
price is but one factor to be considered in determining
the commercial reasonableness of the resale.' 8 7 The
breaching buyer in a fixed price contract assumes the risk
that the market value will decline between the time of his
breach and a reasonable time thereafter for the seller to
effectuate a resale. Section 2-706 appropriately leaves
,84 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706:19, 385 (2d
ed. 1972). See also McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541
S.W.2d 911, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976).
185 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
,86 See President Container, Inc. v. Patimco, 82 A.D.2d 879 440 N.Y.S.2d 313,
31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1372 (1981).
187 United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1488 (5th Cir. 1977).
19851 455
456 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
this risk on the buyer by allowing the seller to base his
damages on the resale. Conversely, if the seller is at full
capacity and engages in a commercially reasonable resale
with a buyer to whom he could not have sold except for
the breach, the seller will be restricted to his compensa-
tory recovery under section 2-706 and should not be al-
lowed to recover damages based on market price. 188 In
such cases, it has even been held that a seller who con-
ducts an improper resale will not be allowed to recover a
greater amount in damages based on market price than he
would have recovered as a result of a proper resale. 8 9
The true "bright line" test for good faith and commer-
cial reasonableness under section 2-706 is whether under
the circumstances, the seller obtained on resale the best
price reasonably possible. Virtually all of the cases which
analyze the concepts of good faith and commercial rea-
sonableness in the context of resales under section 2-706
do so from the standpoint of whether the seller reason-
ably acted under the circumstances to obtain the best pos-
sible price. This focus is logically consistent with the
common law maxim requiring an aggrieved party to act
reasonably to minimize his loss and mitigate the damages
payable by the breaching party, 190 with the interest of sell-
ers in moving their goods as quickly as possible and at the
best possible price, and with the general economic effi-
ciency of keeping goods moving in the marketplace as
smoothly as possible.191
The courts have strongly emphasized the mitigation of
damages function of section 2-706,192 and have, in assess-
ing commercial reasonableness thereunder, spoken in
188 See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950 (1972).
189 Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co. 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1978).
- See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 comment d (1932).
19, See generally U.C.C. § 2-706 comments 4, 5, 6 & 9 (1977).
19 See Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972);




terms of the seller reselling at the "best possible price,"' 93
at the "highest price obtainable,"'' 94 at "as high a price as
possible" 95 and at the "highest offer." 196 In the words of
one court, "[t]he objective of § 2-706(2) in encouraging
the seller to obtain the best possible price by selling
within a reasonable time after the breach without undue
risk or expense is in accord with the basic principles of the
law of damages that a plaintiff must minimize his
losses."' 19 7 Indeed, the courts, as well as the Official Com-
ments to section 2-706, contemplate that a seller in miti-
gating damages may have to expend reasonable amounts
of money or other resources to locate a private pur-
chaser' 98 or to transport goods for public or private resale
at a more lucrative market.' 99 In such cases, of course, the
money or resources expended are recoverable as inciden-
tal damages reasonably incurred under section 2-710.
It is true that section 9-507, the companion to section
2-706, provides in part in subsection (2) that:
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a
sale at a different time or in a different method from that
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially rea-
sonable manner. If the secured party either sells the col-
lateral in the usual manner in any recognized market
therefore or if he sells at the price current in such market
at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among deal-
ers in the type of property sold he has sold in a
Bache, 339 F. Supp. at 351.
Wurlitzer, 334 F. Supp. at 1010.
t95 Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 12, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 977, 990 (4th Cir. 1971).
'9 Cohn v. Fisher, 118 NJ. Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222, 228, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 372, 381 (1972).
197 Bache, 339 F. Supp. at 341, 351, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248
(S.D.N.Y.), afd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972).
,98 United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685, 695, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1488 (5th Cir. 1977).
'- See U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 9 (1978), which states that the seller may be
required to transport the goods "a considerable distance" to locate a commer-
cially reasonable market for resale.
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commercially reasonable manner.20 0
This provision is consistent with the general concept of
mitigation of damages, and says little more than that an
otherwise commercially reasonable resale will not be
overturned simply because it can be shown that a better
price was obtainable elsewhere. If, for example, the seller
conducts the resale according to his customary marketing
practices, the resale will be upheld despite the fact that,
unknown to the seller, a better price could have been ob-
tained by deviating therefrom. In conducting a resale, as
in mitigating damages generally, the seller is only re-
quired to act reasonably. To follow one's established in-
ternal operating procedures is to act reasonably. To
deviate therefrom, with no firm prospect of increased suc-
cess, would be an unwarranted fishing expedition which
would, on the average, exacerbate rather than mitigate
damages. If, on the other hand, the seller is well aware of
the availability of premium prices in a market other than
his normal one, good faith and commercial reasonable-
ness would dictate that he explore the availability of a lu-
crative resale in that market. The good faith and
reasonableness of the seller's conduct must be judged on
the whole, under the facts and circumstances as they ap-
pear to him at the time he makes the resale decision.
Certainly the price obtained on resale is an important
indicia of the degree of reasonableness of the resale.
Although the courts may be guided in determining a rea-
sonable price by considerations similar to those used in
assessing the availability of a reasonable price of resale in
a price action under section 2-709, the determination
under section 2-706 must always be made in the context
of the available alternatives. On occasion, one such alter-
native may be the breaching buyer himself, and a seller
20 U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1977). See California Airmotive Corp. v.Jones, 415 F.2d
554, 556 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1007, 1010 (6th Cir. 1969). The court
stated that "[w]hile we recognize that Uniform Commercial Code § 9-507(1) re-
lieves the Appellee from selling the aircraft at the highest possible price, the sale
must be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner." Jones, 415 F.2d at 556.
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who has some doubt as to the reasonableness of an avail-
able resale price is well advised to consult with, or keep
the buyer abreast of, the developing alternatives. Thus, in
one case the seller, following the buyer's breach with re-
spect to specially built goods, held the goods for the
buyer and attempted to assist the buyer in finding a pur-
chaser for them. 20  A purchaser was thereby found who
was willing to pay the full contract price of $3,609.27.202
The buyer, however, refused to approve the purchaser
and insisted upon making a profit of at least $1,000 on the
resale. The seller then decided to conduct a public resale,
so notified the buyer and advertised the auction. At the
auction, the seller was the highest bidder and purchased
the goods for $800. The jury found the public resale to
be commercially reasonable, and the court on appeal so
affirmed. 03
1. Reasonable Time; Unreasonable Delay
Quite obviously, reasonably mitigating damages by ob-
taining the best available price on resale depends largely
on the timeliness of the seller's action. Good faith and
commercial reasonableness demand that the seller act
within a reasonable time and without unreasonable delay.
Comment 5 to section 2-706 allows the seller flexibility in
selecting the time and place of the resale. It provides:
Subsection (2) merely clarifies the common law rule that
the time for resale is a reasonable time after the buyer's
breach, by using the language "commercially reasonable."
What is such a reasonable time depends upon the nature
of the goods, the condition of the market and other cir-
cumstances of the case; its length cannot be measured by
any legal yardstick or divided into degrees.2 0 4
201 Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1179 (Okla. App. Ct. 1971) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court has directed that this
case not be considered as precedent or authority and that it not be published in
the Pacific Reporter).
202 Id. at 1180.
203 Id. at 1182.
2- U.C.C. § 2-706 comment 5 (1977).
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Comment 3 further provides that: "[e]vidence of market
or current prices at any particular time or place is relevant
only on the question of whether the seller acted in a com-
mercially reasonable manner in making the resale. 20 5
The courts with regularity have overturned as commer-
cially unreasonable resales too far removed in time from
the buyer's breach.20 6 What is a reasonable time depends
upon all the facts and circumstances. Although the seller,
as the injured party, should perhaps be given the benefit
of the doubt, his time for action may be quite short if the
market is declining 20 7 or if the goods are perishable.2 0 8 In
fluctuating markets, where value is not necessarily declin-
ing, it has nevertheless been held that the seller should
not be allowed to speculate on market value at the buyer's
expense.209 Time periods as long as 14 months210 or two
years 2 1 1 and as short as 30 days, 21 2 have been held com-
mercially unreasonable. The entire resale may be thereby
205 Id. comment 3.
2- Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F.Supp. 341, 352, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972);
McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911, 20
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel,
Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57
(1971); Nipkow & Kobelt, Inc. v. Slifka, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1213
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). Cf., Serna, Inc. v. Harman, - F.2d -, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 481 (5th Cir. 1984) (there is no express requirement in section 2-706
that the seller resell "without unreasonable delay" but only that he act "in good
faith" and "in a commercially reasonable manner.")
207 See McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d
911, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976).
208 See Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109, 35 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130 (1982).
2- See G & R Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 33 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
21o McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911,
20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976).
211 Ugaski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d
580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57 (1971); Nipkow & Kobelt, Inc. v. Slifka,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). Cf Koppers Co. v.
Brunswick Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 250, 308 A.2d 32, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 68 (1973) (resale of highly specialized goods with limited market upheld as
commercially reasonable even though made three years following breach).
2' Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972).
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invalidated 213 or only those resales conducted after the
passing of a reasonable time.21 4
A straightforward case is illustrative. The buyer prop-
erly rejected for breach of warranty goods in which he had
a security interest and was thus entitled to resell under
section 2-711(3).215 Some four months later, the seller of-
fered to repurchase the goods from the buyer for approxi-
mately $22,000, without prejudice to any further claim by
the buyer. The buyer refused the seller's offer, stating
that it would not settle for anything less than its full dam-
ages. The buyer held the goods for nearly two years fol-
lowing rejection, made no attempt to find prospective
purchasers for them, gave no notice to the seller of its in-
tention to resell, and ultimatley resold the goods to an
apparently unsolicited purchaser for the amount of
$9,200. During the interim two-year period the condition
of the goods had deteriorated.2 1 6 The court found that
the buyer's resale did not comply with the requirements
of section 2-706.217
When the buyer commits an anticipatory repudiation,
as opposed to a breach by a wrongful rejection, revoca-
tion, or failure to pay the price when due, section 2-610(a)
allows the sellerto "for a commercially reasonable time
await performance by the repudiating party." While the
seller is awaiting such performance, he need not resell.
Accordingly, it has been held that the seller's right to
await the buyer's performance following an anticipatory
213 McMiUan, 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
110 (1976); Uganski, 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 57 (1971); Niphow, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1213 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1976).
214 Bathe & Co., 339 F. Supp. 341, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248
(S.D.N.Y.), afd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972).
215 Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 657 P.2d 109, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 130 (N.M. 1982). Cf Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus., 82 Ill. App.
3d 662,403 N.E.2d 1, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518 (1980) (seller allowed
to use as resale identical goods substituted for goods identified to the breached
contract when it was the first sale of such goods made following breach and within
thirty days thereof).
216 Deaton, 657 P.2d at 109.
217 Id. at 109.
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repudiation extends the time for conducting a reasonable
resale.218 In this case, the buyer argued that the resale
should have been conducted in November or December
shortly following the buyer's repudiation. 219 The court
upheld as timely a resale made by the seller the following
April, the final date set by the contract for performance by
the buyer.220 In the same vein, conduct by the buyer fol-
lowing breach, such as entering into settlement negotia-
tions regarding the dispute with the seller or demanding a
right to inspect the goods, can extend the time for con-
ducting a reasonable resale. Comment 5 to section 2-706
provides that "[w]here a seller contemplating resale re-
ceives a demand from the buyer for inspection under the
section of [sic] preserving evidence of goods in dispute,
the time for resale may be appropriately lengthened. 221
Finally, it has been emphasized that the failure of the
seller to conduct a commercially reasonable resale, or to
218 Aura Orchards v. A. Peitz & Sons, Inc., 27 Agric. Dec. 1546, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 149 (U.S. Dept. of Agric. 1968). See also Klockner, Inc. v. Fed-
eral Wire Mill Corp., 663 F.2d 1370, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1097 (7th
Cir. 1981). However, U.C.C. § 2-6 10 allows the aggrieved party to await perform-
ance for only a reasonable time, which may not extend until the time for perform-
ance. See, -e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson Mortgage Co., 576 F.2d
479, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1282 (3d Cir. 1978).
219 Aura, 27 Agric. Dec. at 1553, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 152.
220 Id.
221 U.C.C § 2-515 (1978). Section 2-215 provides:
In furtherance of the adjustment of any claim or dispute
(a) either party on reasonable notification to the other and for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts and preserving evidence has the
right to inspect, test and sample the goods including such of them as
may be in the possession or control of the other; and
(b) the parties may agree to third party inspection or survey to de-
termine the conformity or condition of the goods and may agree that
the findings shall be binding upon them in any subsequent litigation
or adjustment.
Id.
For a case discussing the relationship between sections 2-706 and 2-515, see
Koppers Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 244 Pa. Super. 250, 308 A.2d 32, 13 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 68 (1973). But, in the case of goods incomplete at the time of
breach, it has been suggested that commercial reasonableness may require the
seller to resell them before completion as "future" goods rather than waiting until
their production is complete. G. WALLACH, THE LAw OF SALES UNDER THE COM-
MERCIAL CODE 8-6 (1981).
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otherwise comply with the requirements of section 2-706,
does not bar the seller from a damage recovery but rele-
gates him to damages computed under section 2-708.
This will generally mean damages based on market price,
evidence of which may sometimes be shown by the
amount received on resale.222 However, where the resale
has been delayed unreasonably, the price thereby ob-
tained is of only "slight probative value ' 223 of the market
price at the time of breach, and the courts have disallowed
its use in such circumstances in providing damages under
section 2-708.224
The fact that the dilatory reseller may nevertheless base
his recovery on the market price at the time and place for
tender under section 2-708(1) will be of small solace if the
market price has declined between the times of the breach
and the tardy resale. For example, in one case involving
the breach of a promise to repurchase cattle at a price of
$44,000, the seller delayed unreasonably and received
only approximately $7,000 when the cattle were ulti-
mately resold some five months after the breach.225 The
court properly denied recovery to the seller on the basis
of the resale formula and relegated him to damages under
section 2-708(1). The market price at the time and place
for tender (the time of the breach) was found to be
$27,000, and damages under the market formula were
thus only $16,000. When this amount was added to the
$7,000 which the seller had received from the delayed re-
sale, the seller pocketed only $23,500, an amount far
short of the $44,000 he would have accumulated had he
222 See B & R Textile Corp. v. Paul Rothman Indus., 101 Misc. 2d 98, 420
N.Y.S.2d 609, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996 (N.Y. App. Term 1979);
Quattlebaum v. Schutt, 27 Agric. Dec. 242, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 370
(U.S. Dept. of Agric. 1968).
223 McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911,
20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110, 113 (1976).
224 Id.; Pantsmaker, Inc. v. Orbit Mfg. Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
103 (N.Y. App. Term 1981); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc. 35 Mich.
App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57 (1971).
2 Cole v. Melvin, 441 F. Supp. 193, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1154
(D.S.D. 1977).
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resold the cattle promptly after the breach.226
E. Burden of Proof
As a rule, the seller, as movant of a claim under section
2-706, has the burden of proof as to all aspects of his
damage claim, including that the resale was conducted in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.
However, the burden here is slight. About all a seller
must do is introduce evidence of the resale price, allege
that he acted reasonably and in good faith, and perhaps
sketch a brief scenario of the resale. The burden of going
forward with the evidence that the resale was commer-
cially unreasonable then rests on the buyer. The situation
was the same prior to the Code under the Uniform Sales
Act, and the flavor of the matter is captured by the follow-
ing language:
Initially, therefore, the burden is on the seller to prove
that the resale was made with reasonable care and judg-
ment . . . Once, however, the seller has introduced evi-
dence establishing that fairness and good faith was
observed the buyer has the burden of showing that it was
not fair and in good faith .... 227
The cases decided under section 2-706 are in accord.228
F. Consequences of Failure to Prove
If the seller fails to secure a finding from the trier of fact
or, in a rare case, as a matter of law,229 that the resale was
conducted in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner, the seller may not recover under section 2-706
but is relegated to a recovery under section 2-708. Com-
226 Id.
227 Howse v. Crumb, 143 Colo. 90, 352 P.2d 285,289 (1960).
22SWurlitzer Co. v. Oliver, 334 F. Supp. 1009, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
367 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1179 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
directed that this opinion not be considered as precedent or authority and not be
published in the Pacific Reporter). See also Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel,
Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57 (1971).
229 See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
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ment 2 to section 2-706 provides that "[f]ailure to act
properly under this section deprives the seller of the mea-
sure of damages here provided and relegates him to that
provided in section 2-708."23o In the usual case, this will
mean damages based on market price at the time and
place for tender.23' However, if the seller can show that
the buyer's breach left him in a "lost volume" situation so
that the invalid resale was one which the seller would have
made regardless of the breach, there is no reason why the
seller should not be allowed to recover his lost profit
under section 2-708(2).
In order to recover on the basis of the market formula,
however, the seller must prove, at trial, a back-up measure
of damages to guide the court in the event that the resale
is held not to be commercially reasonable. Of course, lo-
cal procedural rules may allow a remand of the case to
determine an alternate measure of damages. However,
the seller may be able to avoid remand, or the horror of a
decision rendered against him on the damages point, or a
decision in his favor for only nominal damages (which is
about the same thing), by convincing the trial court that
the price brought by the invalid resale was fair evidence of
the market price at the time and place for tender. This
tactic has appeal when the reason for the invalidity of the
resale is a technical one, such as the failure to give notice
of intention to resell in a private sale.
If the resale, however, is invalidated as commercially
unreasonable for reasons related to the failure of the
seller to act reasonably to obtain the best possible price,
the resale price will have little, if any, probative value as
evidence of the market price. In the words of one court:
In order for a seller to use a resale price as the measure of
its damages, it must be shown that all proper measures to
secure as fair and favorable a sale as possible were taken,
and that the sale was made fairly and to the best advantage
of the buyer. "Without a determination that the sale price
230 See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
2" See U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1977).
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represents either the market price in the case of an avail-
able market for the goods, or that the resale was a fair test
of the actual value in the absence of an available market,
that sale price cannot be determined as the market
value." 232
That the invalid resale price should not be received as fair
evidence of market price is most readily evident in cases
in which the seller has been unreasonably dilatory in con-
ducting the resale. In such cases, the courts have uni-
formly refused to receive the evidence.23 3
In not all cases, however, should the seller who has con-
ducted an invalid resale be allowed to recover damages
based on market price under section 2-708. The Coast
Trading case, discussed above,234 held that a seller could
not recover on the basis of the invalid resale, nor on the
basis of market price, but was limited to a recovery based
on the amount which would have been brought by a rea-
sonably conducted resale. Since the seller was not at "lost
volume" and, accordingly, could not have honored both
the breached contract and the resale contract, section 2-
706 represented the proper compensatory measure of
damages. However, because the resale conducted by the
seller was held to be a commercially unreasonable "wash
sale," the court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings to determine the amount which should have been
brought by a commercially reasonable resale.235
If a resale has been held to be commercially unreasona-
ble and the seller is attempting to recover on the basis of
282 Pantsmaker, Inc. v. Orbit Mfg. Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 103
(N.Y. App. Term 198 1)(quoting Acuri v. Figliolli, 91 Misc. 2d 831, 398 N.Y.S.2d
923 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1977)). Cf Quattlebaum v. Schutt, 27 Agric. Dec. 242, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 370 (U.S. Dept. of Agric.1968) (price of invalid resale con-
tract allowed as evidence of market value in an action under section 2-708(1)).
233 McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 541 S.W.2d 911,
20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane &
Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
57 (1971).
234 Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, (Cal-
laghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1978).
235 Id.
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market price under section 2-708, it is arguable that the
incidental damages allowed by that section and section 2-
710 are unreasonable as well and that their recovery
should be denied. Section 2-710 specifically allows recov-
ery of expenses of resale as incidental damages, if they
were reasonably incurred. If the resale itself was found to
be in bad faith and conducted in a commercially unrea-
sonable manner, the expenses incurred incident to that
resale should be held unreasonable and denied. It has
been so held.2 36 If, however, the resale has been invali-
dated for a technical reason, such as the failure of the
seller to give notice of intention to resell, and the resale
was otherwise commercially reasonable and conducted in
good faith, it has been held with the following statement
that the expenses of resale may be recovered as incidental
damages:
Those incidental damages are allowable to an aggrieved
seller under § 2-710, whether he gets there through § 2-
706 or through § 2-708. It is only § 2-706 which imposes
the condition of a commercially reasonable resale. The
remedies under § 2-708 are not related to a resale. Under
§ 2-710, it is only the incidental damages, not an antece-
dent resale, which must be commercially reasonable.
There is no contention here that the items of damage al-
lowed were not commercially reasonable. 23 7
IV. MEASURING DAMAGES
A. In General
If the seller has made a commercially reasonable resale
and has fulfilled the various other requirements under
section 2-706, subsection (1) provides that the seller may
recover as damages the difference between the price of
the breached contract and the resale price, plus incidental
damages, but less expenses saved by the buyer's breach.
236 Id.
237 Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270, 276, 20
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 117, 125 (1976).
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Thus, if the buyer has breached a contract to pay $10,000
for goods, and the seller is able to resell the goods for
$8,000, his recovery under section 2-706 is $2,000. This
recovery will compensate him if the resale was a "pure"
resale - i.e., a resale to a buyer to whom the seller could
not have sold but for the breach. If the resale is one
which the seller would have made regardless of the
breach, the seller is in a "lost volume" position and the
$2,000 damage recovery will undercompensate him by the
amount of profit he would have made on the resale
contract.
To take our hypothetical a step further, assume that the
breached contract required the seller to ship the goods to
the buyer at his own expense and that shipment costs
would have been $500. Since the seller has saved this ex-
pense, section 2-706 requires that it be deducted from his
recovery, and damages would then total $1500. However,
if the seller incurred additional expenses of $ 100 in adver-
tising the goods for resale and another $300 in shipping
the goods to the resale buyer, this total of $400 for ex-
penses of resale, if reasonably incurred, would be recover-
able as incidental damages under sections 2-706(1) and 2-
710.238 The seller's recovery would thus total $1900.
This simple hypothetical covers the vast majority of
real-world resale transactions. Section 2-706 addresses
this range of cases directly, and the computation of dam-
ages under its provisions is a matter of simply plugging
the appropriate numbers into the formula. However, the
provision does not address several important questions
which are presented by cases slightly aberrant from the
basic scenario. How, for example, are the computations
affected when either the breached contract or the resale
238 U.C.C. §§ 2-706(1), 2-710 (1977). Section 2-710 provides:
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping
delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the
buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or
otherwise resulting from the breach.
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contract, or both, are credit contracts? How does the fact
that the buyer has pre-paid part of the purchase price af-
fect the computations? When, if ever, is resale the
mandatory damage remedy, the failure of which to utilize
will bar the seller from a recovery of damages? If the
seller gives notice under section 2-706 and conducts a re-
sale, is he obligated to use the resale as the basis for com-
puting his damages, or can he proceed instead under
another damage formula? These questions will be ad-
dressed in the succeeding sections.
I. Incidental Damages
Incidental damages can be roughly defined as extra ex-
penses reasonably incurred by the seller as a direct result
of the buyer's breach. Their recovery is authorized by
section 2-706, as qualified by section 2-710.239 They have
been held to include servicing and maintenance
charges, 240 storage and handling costs,2 4 ' and any and all
monies otherwise expended in the care and custody of the
goods affected by the breach. 42
In the present context, expenses incurred in reselling
the goods are a clear example of incidental damages.
They are specifically allowed by section 2-7 10243 and have
239 Id. § 2-710.
240 McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 260 Ark. 422, 511 S.W.2d 911,
20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (1976).
241 Harlow &Jones Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 410 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Indus.
Inc., 82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 403 N.E.2d 1, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 518
(1980).
242 Conner v. Bogrett, 596 P.2d 683, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 902
(Wyo. 1979). See also Contintental-Wirt Elec. Corp. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 329 F.
Supp. 959, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Cesco Mfg.
Corp. v. Norcross, Inc., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270, 27 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 126 (1976); Cohn v. Fisher, 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222,
10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 372 (1972).
243 See, e.g., Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 352,
10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 248, 262 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1972); Johnson Tire Service, Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521, 523, 29 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 774, 777 (Utah 1980); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30
N.Y.2d 393, 401, 285 N.E.2d 311, 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 950 (1972); Bevel-Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1104,
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been held to include expenses ranging from the commis-
sion fee to an auctioneer at a public sale 244 to the expense
of a classified advertisement in a local newspaper in a pri-
vate sale.245 Indeed, in an action under section 2-706,
where the resale price equals the price of the breached
contract, incidental damages form the sole basis for a
damage recovery.246 It can be plausibly argued, however,
that if the seller is left by the breach in a "lost volume"
situation, so that the resale is one which would have been
made regardless of the breach, the expenses of resale are
not extra expenses "resulting from the breach," as re-
quired by section 2-7 10, and, thus, should not be recover-
able as incidental damages. To date no reported decision
has addressed this argument.
The Code makes no provision for a seller's recovery of
consequential damages. The distinction between conse-
quential and incidental damages is often a difficult one to
make.247 Suffice it to say at this point, whereas incidental
damages usually entail extra expense incurred by the
seller as a result of the breach, consequential damages in-
volve remote losses which arise as a result of the special
circumstances of the seller's situation, including contrac-
tual relationships with third parties. The distinction is im-
portant, because the courts have generally held that a
seller is not entitled to recover consequential damages. 48
1109, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1333, 1340 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Lee
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270, 276 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 117, 124-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Brownie's Army & Navy
Store v. Ej. Burke, Jr., Inc., 72 A.D.2d 171, 424 N.Y.S.2d 800, 804, 28 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 90, 94 (1980); Bruce Church, Inc. v. Tested Best Foods
Div. of Kane-Miller Corp., 28 Agric. Dec. 377, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
326, 329 (U.S. Dept.ofAgric. 1969).
21, Berg v. Hogan, 322 N.w.2d 448, 453-54, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
505, 511 (N.D. 1982).
21-1 Smith v. Joseph, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1560, 1565 (D.C. Super.
Ct. 1981).
246 Id.
247 See generally Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp.
503, 508 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 661, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 26 § 2-710:01, at 346-49.
248 Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. v. Ameropan Oil Co., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508, 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 661, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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Further, although it is necessary to any recovery of conse-
quential damages that the loss be shown to be within the
contemplation of the parties, there is no such requirement
under the Code for incidental damages. 249 The primary
requirement is simply that they be reasonably incurred.
It has been held that the reasonable expense of insuring
the goods following breach is an incidental damage prop-
erly recoverable by the aggrieved seller under section 2-
7 10.250 But what about finance charges incurred by the
seller on loans covering the goods between the time of
the breach and the time the goods are resold? These
charges are incidental damages in the sense that they are
extra expenses incurred by the seller as a result of the
breach. On the other hand, the charges are arguably con-
sequential damages in that they represent remote losses
incurred by the seller under contractual arrangements
with third parties. The question is a recurring one, be-
cause it is quite common for commercial sellers to have
their inventories highly leveraged by loans thereon at
least to the point in time when the goods are sold. To
date, the courts have held such finance charges to be inci-
dental damages and have allowed their recovery. 251
These cases are fairly decided if the finance charges are
actually extra expenses caused by the breach. This would
be true if the seller can show that the loan would have
been repaid at the time the breaching buyer paid for the
goods. If, on the other hand, the loan was not to be re-
249 Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 781, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568,
570 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1980, no writ).
250 Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 315, 334
N.Y.S.2d 165, 171, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 955 (1972); Gray v.
West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 781, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568, 571 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Amarillo 1980, no writ).
251 Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1024, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1978); Berg v. Hogan, 322 N.W.2d 448,
453-54, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 505, 511 (N.D. 1982); Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 401, 285 N.E.2d 311, 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 955 (1972); Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771,
781, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568, 571 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1980,
no writ). See also, Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1190 (Me. 1983).
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paid at that time but was for a fixed term, with the inven-
tory (and thus the goods involved in the breached
contract) merely serving as the collateral for the loan,
then the buyer's breach caused the seller no extra ex-
pense and should not be recoverable. 252 The seller will
be compensated for his loss by a simple recovery of pre-
judgment interest, allowed in virtually all jurisdictions.
In one case, the seller argued for an interesting and
lawyer-like extension of analysis for insurance and finance
charges as incidental damages. The seller argued that he
should be entitled not only to a recovery for insurance
and finance charges on the goods involved in the
breached contract, but also for insurance expenses on ad-
ditional collateral required by his creditor to be put up by
the seller when the value of the goods identified to the
breached contract declined following the buyer's breach.
Although the court allowed recovery for the finance
charges and initial insurance expense, it refused to allow
recovery for the insurance expenses incurred on the addi-
tional collateral. The court said that such expenses were
too remote to be regarded as incidental damages.253
The courts have split on whether the expenses of an in-
valid resale are properly recoverable as incidental dam-
ages. 54 A case disallowing such recovery involved a
fictitious resale in which the seller immediately bought
back the goods in a paper transaction. On such facts, the
disallowance of any expenses involved was reasonable.
On the other hand, if the resale has been invalidated on
the basis of a technical failure to give notice of resale,
there would appear to be no reason to disallow the resale
expenses themselves. The seller is still allowed to recover
252 See Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 726-27, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1190, 1196 (Me. 1983).
253 Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 781, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568,
571 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1980, no writ).
254 Compare Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1978) (expenses not allowed) with Lee Oldsmo-
bile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (expenses allowed).
[50
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damages based on market price under section 2-708, and
that section also allows recovery of incidental damages. If
the resale expenses were reasonably incurred, their recov-
ery should be allowed even if the resale contract itself was
in some sense commercially unreasonable.
2. Expenses Saved
Section 2-706 requires that the seller account to the
buyer for any expenses saved as a result of the buyer's
breach. If the seller is proceeding on the basis of the re-
sale formula, the goods will have been completed and any
expenses saved will probably take the form of the cost of
getting the goods to the buyer, if the contract so requires,
or the cost of installation of the goods as required by the
contract. Expenses saved will usually be netted out
against the incidental damages of costs of resale. For ex-
ample, if the breached contract required the seller to
transport the goods to the buyer at a cost of $500, and the
buyer's breach prevents this performance, the seller will
have saved $500 in expenses. If in reselling the goods,
the seller incurs costs of $600, the buyer's damage liability
is a net $100 (resale expenses less expenses saved) plus
the differential between the contract price and the resale
price.255 Of course, if the expenses saved exceed the
damages suffered by the seller, so that the buyer's breach
actually benefited the seller rather than causing him in-
jury, the seller is not accountable to the buyer for the ex-
penses saved. Such expenses go only to reduce the
seller's damage recovery so that he is put in no better po-
sition than he would have occupied had the contract been
performed.
B. Seller Not Accountable for Profit
If the resale price exceeds the price of the breached
contract, so that the seller profits by the breach, he may
retain that profit and is not accountable to the buyer for
25 See generally Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 (1951).
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it. 256 This is clear enough. Section 2-706, however, does
not define profit. Assume that the seller resells goods for
$10,000, that the price of the breached contract is $8,000,
that no expenses are saved, but that incidental damages
are incurred in the form of resale expenses of $500. On
these facts, the seller should be denied any recovery
under section 2-706. The seller might argue that he is en-
titled to retain the $2,000 profit and to recover the $500
incidental damages against the buyer. A fair reading of
subsection (1) of section 2-706, however, would interpret
profit to mean the net of excess made on the resale con-
tract less any incidental damages suffered. To allow the
seller to recover the incidental damages, while retaining
the $2,000 profit, would both place him in a better posi-
tion than he would have occupied had the contract been
performed and subject the buyer to penal damages, both
results which are prohibited by section 1-106.257
Further, such results would violate the basic principle
of mitigation of damages by encouraging a seller to incur
extraordinary resale expenses to inflate the price of the
resale contract. For example, in our hypothetical if the
resale expenses represent $500 in transportation costs,
the true value of the resale contract is $9,500. Stated dif-
ferently, the resale buyer would be willing to pay either
$10,000, with the seller incurring the transportation costs,
or $9,500, with the resale buyer incurring those costs him-
self. This demonstrates that the true resale price is the
lower figure and that, accordingly, incidental damages
should be deducted from the seller's "profit," as that term
is used in section 2-706(6).258 This method of computa-
tion would provide no encouragement to sellers to inflate
256 Section 2-706(6) provides that "[t]he seller is not accountable to the buyer
for any profit made on any resale." U.C.C. § 2-706(6) (1977). See Mott Equity
Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d. 900, 908, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
388, 399 (N.D. 1975).
257 U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977).
258 See generally W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:08. But see 1 W. HAWK-
LAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 284-85
(1964).
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the resale contract price by absorbing ordinary or ex-
traordinary resale expenses.
A related problem arises if the seller resells the goods
in installments, some of which bring a price in excess of,
and others a price less than, the price of the breached
contract. Does section 2-706(6) allow the seller to retain
the profit made on some of the installments and recover
damages based on the others? Assume that the breached
contract called for the sale of 1,000 units at one dollar
each. Following the breach, the seller is able reasonably
to resell the goods in two resales. The first resale is of
500 units at $1.25, and the seller thereby incurs a "profit"
on those units of $125. The second resale of the other
500 units brings only $.90 per unit, and thus the seller
receives $50 less for those goods than his expectation
under the breached contract. However, considering both
resales, the seller is better off by $75 than he would have
been had the contract been performed. Certainly he is
entitled by subsection (6) to retain that amount. But he
should not be allowed to add insult to non-injury by main-
taining an action against the buyer based on the losing
resale of half the goods.
Several reasons, besides logic and fairness, support this
conclusion. First, section 1-106 of the Code dictates that
the seller be put only in "as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed." Only by calculating damages
on the basis of both resales can the failure of the full per-
formance by the buyer be assessed accurately. Second, in
a related context, section. 2-612 demonstrates a strong
Code policy in favor of treating related installments as
part of the same cowract. It provides that "[a]n 'install-
ment contract' is one which requires or authorizes the de-
livery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted,
even though the contract contains a clause 'each delivery
is a separate contract' or its equivalent." Similar treat-
ment should be accorded installment resales. Finally, if
the seller was seeking remedy under section 2-708(1) and
attempting to prove market price thereunder by evidence
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of the resale value of the goods, the seller would certainly
be required to show all of the resales to establish accu-
rately the value of the goods. Similarly, under section 2-
706 he must show all of the resales to establish accurately
the amount of his loss.
1. When the Buyer Prepays
The extent of the right of the seller to retain the profit
made on the resale contract is called into question when
the buyer has made payments on the contract price prior
to breach. The discussion which follows will assume that
the prepayments were not intended by the parties to be
retained by the seller as liquidated damages in the event
of the buyer's breach. Further, the discussion will ignore
incidental damages suffered by and expenses saved by the
aggrieved seller, matters which have been discussed previ-
ously. The results here are consistent with that
discussion. 59
To take an easy case, assume the price of the breached
contract is $10,000, that the goods are resold for $8,000,
and that the buyer has paid the seller $1,000 on the
breached contract. Clearly here the seller's damages are
$1,000 (the $2,000 resale differential less the $1,000 pay-
ment by the buyer). Although there is no provision in
section 2-706 for crediting the buyer with his prepayment,
to not do so would allow the seller a windfall and penalize
the buyer. Such a result would ignore the dictate of sec-
tion 1-106 that remedies be "liberally administered" to
the end of achieving compensation. Section 2-706 should
be read to allow the seller only a recovery of the differ-
ence between the resale price and the unpaid contract
price. I have found no argument to the contrary by either
case or commentary.
The situation becomes more complex when the resale
contract price exceeds that of the breached contract. As-
sume that the price of the breached contract is $8,000,
259 See supra notes 238-254, 256-258 and accompanying text.
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that the goods are resold for $10,000, and that the buyer
has paid $1,000 on the breached contract. On these facts,
the seller has suffered no damages and is not likely to be a
plaintiff in a cause of action against the breaching buyer.
Is the breaching buyer, however, entitled to recover the
$1,000 payment made to the seller? The action would be
in restitution, governed by section 2-718.26o Subsection
(2) thereof allows the buyer to recover his down payment
reduced by the lesser of twenty per cent of the value of
the total performance or $500. Accordingly, the buyer is
entitled to a return of $500 ($1,000 - $500). This
amount is subject to further reduction under subsection
(3) "to the extent that the seller establishes. . . a right to
recover damages." 26 ' On our facts, the seller could show
no such right.262 The seller might argue such a right by
260 Section 2-718 provides in part:
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because
of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any
amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms
liquidating the seller's damages in accordance with subsection (1),
or
(b) in the ab-ence of such terms, twenty percent of the value of
the total performance for which the buyer is obligated under the
contract or $500, whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is subject to
offset to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this Arti-
cle other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer
directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.
U.C.C. § 2-718(2)&(3) (1978).
261 Id. § 2-718(3). A literal reading ot section 2-718 allows the seller to offset
against the buyer's restitution recovery both the $500 (or the twenty per cent of
the value of the total performance if it is less) and the damages actually suffered.
This allows the seller a statutory windfall of the $500 or twenty percent figure. See
Feinberg v. J. Bongiovi Contracting, 110 Misc. 2d 379, 442 N.Y.S.2d 399, 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 139 (1981). Cf Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30
N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
950 (1972) (allowing the seller to offset against the buyer's right to restitution
under section 2-718 only the actual damages suffered).
262 See Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., 541 S.W.2d 706, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), in which the buyer was held entitled
under section 2-718 to recover a $5,000 down payment less $500 and the amount
of damages the seller could prove at trial on remand.
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virtue of section 2-706(6), which holds the seller "not ac-
countable to the buyer for any profit made on any resale."
The down payment, however, is not a profit made on re-
sale, and further, the provision does not establish any
damages actually suffered by the seller.263
The situation is similar, and the result consistent, when
the resale price plus the breaching buyer's prepayment
exceed the price of the breached contract, even though
the resale contract price standing alone does not. Assume
that the price of the breached contract is $10,000, that the
resale contract price is $8,000, and that the buyer has paid
in advance $3,000. On these facts, the seller has suffered
$2,000 in actual damages. Under section 2-718, the buyer
is entitled to restitution of $500 (the $3,000 payment less
the statutory $500 less the $2,000 actual damages suffered
by the seller under section 2-706).264
C. Credit Contracts: Discount to Present Value
When either the resale contract or the breached con-
tract, or both, is for the payment of the contract price on
credit, either by lump sum or in installments, the compu-
tation of damages under section 2-706 becomes more
complex. For example, assume that the price of the
breached contract is $10,000, cash on delivery, and the
263 It is respectfully suggested that this situation has been incorrectly analyzed
by Professor Hawkland. See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, § 2-706:09, at 310-12.
Examples of cases correctly applying section 2-718 by offsetting against the
buyer's right of restitution actual damages suffered by the seller are as follows:
Wendling v. Puls, 227 Kan. 780, 610 P.2d 580, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1362 (1980); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334
N.Y.S.2d 165, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950 (1972); Chicago Roller Skate
Mfg. Co. v. Sokol Mfg. Co., 185 Neb. 515, 177 N.W.2d 25, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 804 (1970); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field
Warehous. Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 157 (1965).
26 It should be noted that it is a bit illogical for the buyer to breach in this
situation, because under the contract he is entitled to receive $8,000 worth of
goods for an additional payment of $7,000. However, buyers do breach in such
cases. See, e.g., Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., 541 S.W.2d 706, 20 U.C.C.




seller resells the goods following breach for $10,000 to be
paid in equal installments over 10 months. Obviously, the
present cash value of the resale contract is less than
$10,000 and to compare the two contracts without some
present valuation of the resale contract is to compare ap-
ples and oranges, leaving the seller undercompensated
with no recovery under the formula of section 2-706. Ac-
cordingly, prior to applying the formula, it will be neces-
sary to adjust the resale contract downward to reflect its
present value.
A similar adjustment must be made if it is the breached
contract which is on credit, and the resale is a cash trans-
action. The value of the breached contract would be ad-
justed downward, thereby reducing the seller's damages
and, of course, if both contracts are for payment of the
price in the future, both must be discounted to their pres-
ent value before one can be fairly set off against the other.
Presumably, a breached contract should be valued at the
time of breach and the resale contract at the time of
resale.
Although no reported decision to date has addressed
these situations,26 5 the courts should have little problem
with them when they do arise. The courts frequently re-
duce awards of future damages to present value.266 And
in this age of mega-buck personal injury damage awards,
court settlements and professional athlete contracts, the
service of calculating the present worth of such awards,
settlements and contracts has become institutionalized in
most large cities and is readily available to aid the belea-
guered, but soon-to-be-quite-happy, plaintiff's attorney in
making the appropriate calculations.
D. When Resale Fixes Damages
An important question, not addressed directly by sec-
265 See generally, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63 at 266-67.
266 See Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth, 21 Ohio St. L.J. 204
(1960); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 570-74 (1973); C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 299-309 (1935).
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tion 2-706, is whether or not a resale conducted by the
seller in accordance with its provisions obligates the seller
to use that resale as the basis for computing damages at
trial to the exclusion of other damage remedies under the
Code. As we have seen,26 7 in order for a seller to have the
benefit of its provisions, section 2-706 will often require
the resale to be conducted shortly following breach. Fur-
ther, notice to the buyer is generally required.2 68  For
these reasons, it can quite easily happen that a seller who
wishes to preserve his options under section 2-706 will
give resale notice to the buyer and conduct an identified
resale at a time when he is not yet in a position to assess
accurately his damage situation.
If the resale turns out to be a "true" resale to a party to
whom the seller could not have sold but for the buyer's
breach, the resale formula will compensate him and
should be used. 269 But what if, as it turns out, the seller is
in a "lost volume" situation, in that the resale was one
which the seller would have made regardless of the
buyer's breach? In this situation, the resale formula will
not compensate the seller and will fail to honor his lost
expectation by the amount of profit he would have made
on the resale contract. 270 Nevertheless, is the seller obli-
gated to use section 2-706 or can he proceed at trial to
recover under the compensatory lost profit formula of
section 2-708(2)? At least three strong arguments favor
allowing the seller to preserve his options in this situation.
First, section 1-106 mandates that the courts "liberally"
administer the Code's remedies to the end of achieving
compensation to the aggrieved party without penalty to
27 See supra notes 204-226 and accompanying text.
2- See supra notes 67-114 and accompanying text and, in particular, text accom-
panying notes 79-94.
269 For a discussion of whether or not the use of a "true" resale by the seller is
mandated by the Code, see infra text accompanying notes 276-291.
270 The best judicial discussion of the concepts of "true" resales and "lost vol-
ume" sellers remains that of Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285
N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950 (1972). See
also, Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commer-
cial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66 (1965).
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the breaching party. On our facts, the profit formula, and
not the resale formula, achieves compensatior. Further,
the breaching buyer is not likely to have been prejudiced,
by detrimental reliance or the like, by the fact that the
seller has given notice of resale. In a public resale situa-
tion, the buyer might have a detrimental reliance argu-
ment based on his efforts in attending the resale or in
persuading other prospective purchasers to attend. How-
ever, a public resale by auction is almost certainly a "true"
resale in that it is not one which the seller would have
made in the ordinary course of business except for the
buyer's breach. Thus, in the public resale case, the seller
should be obligated to use the resale formula.2 7'
Second, comment 1 to section 2-703 expresses a strong
policy against election of remedies and in favor of al-
lowing the aggrieved seller to preserve his options. It
states that "[t]his Article rejects any doctrine of election
of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies
are essentially cumulative in nature and include all of the
available remedies for breach. Whether the pursuit of
one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of
the individual case." In our case, the facts strongly call
for allowing the seller to pursue the profit formula under
section 2-708(2).
Third, the drafting history of the Code reveals that lan-
guage formerly allowing other damage remedies to be
used only "so far as any goods have not been resold" was
deleted to make it clear that the aggrieved seller was not
required to elect between damages under section 2-706
and damages under section 2-708.272 On the other hand,
if the seller is at full capacity, so that the resale is a "true"
resale, the cases indicate that the resale formula will set
the upper limit of the seller's damages.273 This, of course,
271 For a discussion of the seller's obligation to use the resale formula in a
"true" resale situation, see Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722,
36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1190 (Me. 1983).
272 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM. REP. 550-52 (1955). SeeJ. WHITE AND R.
SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 272.
273. See Publicker Indus. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 652 F.2d 340, 32 U.C.C.
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is as it should be. The possibility is left open, however,
that a full capacity seller might intentionally violate the
requirements of section 2-706 in conducting the resale by
either failing to give notice to the buyer or by conducting
the resale in a manner that is in some way commercially
unreasonable. Such a course of conduct would be benefi-
cial to the seller if the market price at the time and place
for tender is less than the resale price. The seller would
be tempted to resell the goods at a particularly attractive
price, having failed to give notice thereof to the buyer,
and bring his action against the buyer under the market
formula of section 2-708(1). Since the seller was at full
capacity, and the resale was a "true" resale, any recovery
against the buyer in excess of that allowed by the resale
formula would represent a windfall to the seller and a
penalty to the buyer. The cases to date that have ad-
dressed the problem have appropriately held that the
seller should be restricted in such circumstances to the
amount which would be allowed by the resale formula for
a commercially reasonable resale. 74 The commentators
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts are in agree-
ment with this result. 275
E. When Resale is Mandatory
What if the seller is in a full capacity situation, has more
customers than he can supply, and the buyer breaches?
Clearly the seller should immediately resell the goods to
one of his waiting customers. In this situation, he is likely
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 449 (3d Cir. 1981); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d
393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950
(1972). See also, Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1979).
274 See Coast Trading, .592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1037 (9th
Cir. 1979). See also Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v.Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463
N.E.2d 70, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845 (1983) (where seller was not at
"lost volume" and resold the goods for the same price as that of the breached
contract, no damages were recoverable).
275 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 347 comment e (-); G. WALLACH,
THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8-6 (198 1);J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 271-273 (2d ed. 1980).
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to have suffered no damages beyond, perhaps, inciden-
tals, because the law of supply and demand will usually
dictate that the resale price equal or exceed the price of
the breached contract. But what if, for whatever reason,
the seller withdraws the goods from the market, brings ac-
tion against the buyer on the basis of the market formula
of section 2-708(1) and refuses to resell the goods until at
least after trial? There is potential for abuse here by the
seller because theoretically he could recover damages
against the buyer and then subsequently incur a windfall
when he does resell the goods. Further, this course of ac-
tion by the seller represents an unwarranted failure to
mitigate damages by resale. Nevertheless, nothing in the
text of section 2-706 obligates the seller to use its provi-
sions, and there is Code commentary against forcing the
seller to choose a particular remedy.276 The courts, how-
ever, have persuasively determined that the overriding
principles of compensation and mitigation of damages re-
quire that the seller either resell when such action would
mitigate his loss or be barred from recovery of any dam-
ages that could have been thereby avoided. 2 7
In an interesting case on point involving a contract to
purchase a mobile home, when circumstances indicated
that the buyer might breach the contract, the buyer's fa-
ther inquired as to whether he could purchase the home
at the contract price of $23,028.69 so that his son would
not lose his $1,000 deposit. 278 The father expressed a
willingness to mortgage his own home to finance the sale.
The seller ignored the father's offer, resold the home to a
third party for $22,000 and brought an action against the
son under section 2-708(2) for $4,800 in lost profit and
276 See U.C.C. § 2-703 comment 1 (1977) and supra notes 208-216 and accompa-
nying text.
277 For a discussion of the mitigation of damages policy underlying section 2-
706 of the Uniform Commercial Code, see supra notes 11-17, 184-226 and accom-
panying text.
278 Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1190, 1191-92 (Me. 1983).
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interest expense.279 The trial court found for the seller,
but only in the amount of $759.45, as reflected by the dif-
ference between the contract price and the resale price
plus incidental damages. Both parties appealed. The
court on appeal found for the buyer and denied recovery
to the seller based either on lost profit or the resale.280
The court said that the determinative issue in the case was
the seller's failure to mitigate damages and that the seller
should have taken "reasonable affirmative measures to
keep its losses to a minimum" by pursuing the resale of-
fered by the buyer's father. This resale would have fully
mitigated the seller's loss. 2 l ' The court further held that
the seller was not entitled to lost profits under section 2-
708(2) because the proposed resale to the buyer's father
would not have left the seller in a "lost volume" situta-
tion.2 s2 Since the father conditioned his offer on his son's
failure to complete the purchase, the resale to the father
would not have been to a party who would have
purchased notwithstanding the buyer's breach. The seller
simply could not have made both sales and, had it pro-
ceeded properly by mitigating its damages, it would not
have lost the one sale.2 8 3
In another case, the buyer breached contracts to
purchase wheat because of a shortage of railroad cars to
ship the wheat to market.28 4 The sellers retained posses-
sion of the wheat and brought an action against the buyer.
The court denied recovery to the sellers, stating that they
should have immediately resold the wheat following the
buyer's breach. 28 5 The court said that the sellers were not
damaged because the market price at the time of the
breach was nearly double the contract price. The court
279 Shiavi, 463 A.2d at 723-24.
2- id. at 726.
281 Id. at 725.
282 id. at 725-26.
283 Id. at 726.
284 Desbien v. Penokee Farmers Union Coop. Ass'n, 220 Kan. 358, 552 P.2d
917, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 102 (1976).
285 Desbien, 552 P.2d at 927.
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noted that the sellers still had possession of the wheat and
were free to resell the wheat in the future at the best avail-
able price.286 The result in the case was further supported
by the fact that the sellers were apparently in a full capac-
ity situation. They were farmers, and the sale was evi-
dently of their entire crop. To allow any damage recovery
would have allowed them to withdraw their goods from
the market, recover damages, and then receive a windfall
on a subsequent profitable resale of the goods. The sell-
ers had improperly failed to mitigate damages and
presented the danger to the court of overcompensating
them by the amount of profit they could make on a subse-
quent sale of the goods.28 7
In another case, a full capacity seller effectively with-
drew the goods from the market by engaging in a ficti-
tious resale with a third party from whom the seller
immediately repurchased the goods in a paper transac-
tion. 88 When the seller subsequently attempted to re-
cover damages based on the fictitious resale, the court
found the resale commercially unreasonable and denied
recovery based thereon. Further, the court held that since
the seller was at full capacity he, should have mitigated
damages by a valid resale, thus, damages would be and
limited to those based on the price that would have been
brought by a commercially reasonable resale.289
However, if a mitigation of damages will not result, the
286 Id.
287 See James Mfg. Co. v. Stovner, I Wash. App. 27, 459 P.2d 51 (1969) (seller
should not be allowed to "have his cake and eat it." 459 P.2d at 55). However,
there would appear to be no reason a seller in this position could not recover
damages based on the market formula if he meets the requirements of section 2-
708(1). In effect, by crediting the buyer in the 2-708(1) action for the market
price at the time and place for tender, the seller himself would have made a hypo-
thetical purchase of the goods at that price and should be entitled to speculate at
his own risk and the market fluctuation subsequent to the breach. In Desbien the
market price excluded that of the breached contract, and thus the sellers suffered
no damages.
288 Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1037 (9th Cir. 1979). See also, James Mfg., 1 Wash. App. 27, 459 P.2d 51
(1969).
289 Cudahy, 592 F.2d at 1083.
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seller is not obligated to resell the goods. Thus, in one
case, where there was, apparently, no market for the
goods, the seller acted properly in not purchasing the
goods from its supplier for resale.290 Similarly, if the
seller is in a "lost volume" situation, his resale of the
goods should not obligate him to measure damages under
section 2-706.29' Any such resale would not mitigate his
damages because he would still be left less than whole by
the amount of profit that he could have made by making
both sales.
1. To Mitigate Incidental Damages
The courts have also held, under the general principle
of mitigation of damages, that the seller will be denied
recovery of any incidental damages that could have been
avoided by a timely and commercially reasonable re-
sale.292 Such damages would not be reasonably incurred
as required by section 2-710. Further, a denial of recov-
ery is consistent with the parallel provision in section 2-
715(2)(a) which denies the buyer a recovery as conse-
quential damages of any loss that could have been reason-
ably avoided.
V. MISCELLANY
A. Resale by Buyer
A buyer who rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes ac-
ceptance is given a security interest by section 2-711(3) in
goods in his possession or control for any payments made
on their price and for any expenses reasonably incurred
with respect to them.293 The buyer is allowed to foreclose
2- Copymate Marketing, Ltd. v. Modem Merchandising, Inc., 34 Wash. App.
300, 660 P.2d 332, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 161 (1983).
291 See supra notes 267-275 and accompanying text.
292 See Broglie v. MacKay-Smith, 541 F.2d 453, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 114 (4th
Cir. 1976); E-Z Roll Hardware Mfg. Co. v. H & H. Prod. & Finishing Corp., 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1045 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
293 Section 2-711(3) provides:
On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer
has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any
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on the security interest by reselling the goods. If the
buyer resells, he must comply with the provisions of sec-
tion 2-706. His situation thereunder is the same as that of
the seller, and the above discussion has not differentiated
cases involving resales by sellers from rcsales by buy-
ers. 294 The only distinction is made by subsection (6)
which provides that, although the seller is not accountable
to the buyer for any profit made on the resale, a buyer
must account for any excess over the amount of his secur-
ity interest produced by the resale.29 5
The importance of this distinction is well illustrated by
a case in which the buyer rightfully rejected non-con-
forming goods, stored them, and awaited instructions
from the seller as to disposal of the goods. 96 When no
instructions were given, the buyer, with no notice to the
seller, resold the goods over a three-year period. The
buyer did not render an accounting to the seller with re-
spect to the proceeds of the resales. In an action by the
payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred
in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and
may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved
seller (Section 2-706).
U.C.C. § 2-711 (3) (1977).
294 A fair sampling of cases involving section 2-706 resales by aggrieved buyers
includes the following: Borglie v. MacKay-Smith, 541 F.2d 453, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 114 (4th Cir. 1976); Eska Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear
Co., 483 F. Supp. 1228, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 534 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 130 (1982); GNP Commodities, Inc. v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 95 Ill.
App. 3d 966, 420 N.E.2d 659, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1342 (1981);
Bevel-Fold Inc. v. Bose Corp., 9 Mass. App. 576, 402 N.E.2d 1104, 28 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1333 (1980); North Am. Steel Corp. v. Siderius, 75 Mich.
App. 391, 254 N.W.2d 899, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 62 (1977); Uganski
v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57 (1971).
295 Section 2-706(6) provides:
The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on
any resale. A person in the position of a seller (Section 2-707) or
buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance
must account for any excess over the amount of his security interest,
as hereinafter defined (subsection (3) of Section 2-711).
U.C.C. § 2-706(6) (1977).
2'9J6 Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co., 483 F. Supp. 1228, 29 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 534 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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seller, the court emphasized that the goods remained the
property of the seller following the rejection, subject only
to the security interest of the buyer.29 7 Further, section 2-
706(6) required the buyer to maintain careful records of
the resales and their proceeds and to account to the seller
for those proceeds, plus interest thereon, after deducting
the amount of the allowable security interest. 298  The
buyer was held liable to the seller for this amount, and,
most importantly, the court held that the failure of the
buyer to follow its duty to maintain accurate records
would cause all uncertainties as to amounts to be ren-
dered against it.29 9
1. Resale by a Person in the Position of a Seller
Section 2-706(6) also provides that a person in the posi-
tion of a seller must account to the seller for any excess
over the amount of his security interest. A person in the
position of a seller is defined in Section 2-707 and in-
cludes any factor or other agent who has advanced his
personal credit or funds for the purchase of goods on be-
half of his principal.300 Classic recurring commercial ex-
amples are banks or other financing agencies which have
honored letters of credit or drafts on behalf of their cus-
tomers.3 0 ' Another typical example would be an art
dealer who acts as an agent for his customer in purchasing
297 Keiderfabrik, 483 F.Supp. at 1234.
298 Id. at 1234-35.
Id. at 1235.
-0o Section § 2-707 provides:
(1) A "person in the position of a seller" includes as against a
principal an agent who has paid or become responsible for the price
of goods on behalf of his principal or anyone who otherwise holds a
security interest or other right in goods similar to that of a seller.
(2) A person in the position of a seller may as provided in this
Article withhold or stop delivery (Section 2-705) and resell (Section
2-706) and recover incidental damages (Section 2-710).
U.C.C. § 2-707 (1977).
-1 For a more complete discussion of Section 2-707, see W. HAWKLAND, supra
note 26, § 2-707, at 314-21.
RESALE UNDER UCC
a painting.30 2 If the art dealer purchases the painting per
its principal's instructions, takes title in the principal's be-
half, but commits its own funds therefore, it has a security
interest in the painting for that amount. In the event that
the art dealer is not reimbursed for its expenses, it may
resell the painting but must account to its customer-prin-
cipal for any amount produced by the resale in excess of
its security interest.
B. Variation by Agreement
Within reasonable parameters, the resale provisions of
section 2-706 may be varied by agreement of the parties.
The right of the parties to provide for waiver or other va-
riation of the resale notice requirements has been dis-
cussed previously.3 0 3 The standard for contractual
variations of Code provisions is provided by section 1-
102(3), which provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agree-
ment, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except
that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonable-
ness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such obliga-
tions is to be measured if such standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable. 0 4
The essential thrust of section 2-706 is good faith and
commercial reasonableness. Clearly the parties cannot
agree to the contrary. On the other hand, it is quite com-
mon in security agreements for the parties to agree that
any foreclosure sale on collateral following breach by the
debtor will be conducted in a specified manner, rather
302 See Hart v. Sims, 702 F.2d 574, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1517 (5th
Cir. 1983).
303 See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. See also Steelman v. Associ-
ates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 697 (1970).
- U.C.C. § 2-706(b) (1978).
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than strictly in compliance with applicable law.3 5 With
respect to personal property security agreements, the ap-
plicable law includes section 2-706.306 Such provisions
will be upheld except that "[o]bligations of 'reasonable-
ness and care. . . may not be disclaimed by agreement,'
but the parties may agree to the standards to be applied if
they 'are not manifestly unreasonable.' "9307
305 See Brunswick Corp. v. Starlite Lanes, Inc., 33 Mich. App. 490, 190 N.W.2d
302 (1971).
306 Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 697, 700 (1970). The court stated: "Irrespective of
whether the agreement here comes under the provisions of Article 2 - Sales, or
Article 9 - Secured Transactions, or both, the rights of a secured party in posses-
sion of the security on default of the debtor are governed by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code." Steelman, 175 S.E.2d at 64. See also A. & P. Trucking
v. Phil Long Ford, Inc., 676 P.2d 1267, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1437
(1984).
507 Steelman, 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
697, 700 (1970) (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 109A 1-102(3) (1962)). See also French
v. Sotheby & Co., 470 P.2d 318, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 685 (Okla.
1970)(auction catalogue specified that upon breach by buyer the goods would be
resold and the buyer held liable for any loss arising from the resale and the ex-
penses thereof); Brunswick Corp. v. Starlite Lanes, Inc., 33 Mich. App. 490, 190
N.W.2d 302 (1971) (agreement specified the manner in which a foreclosure sale
would be conducted).
